holding Tenure Act provided immunity to school officials despite their false claims of misappropriation of school funds against the plaintiff and conspiracy to testify falsely during the teacher’s administrative hearing
How later courts described this case
- holding Tenure Act provided immunity to school officials despite their false claims of misappropriation of school funds against the plaintiff and conspiracy to testify falsely during the teacher’s administrative hearing
- “When courts have implied a private right of action from a criminal statute, the statute invariably is intended to protect a particular class of people.”
- adopting factors from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975)
- “willfulness, malice, or corruption”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONNER, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the holding of my colleagues herein. I agree with the majority that the defendants cannot rely upon executive immunity when the allegations are that they acted willfully, maliciously and corruptly in investigating and prosecuting plaintiff. However, I disagree that T.C.A. § 49-1416(9) gives “the superintendent or other school officials” a carte blanche in prosecuting charges. The statute provides for immunity from liability “when performing their duties in prosecuting charges against any teacher. . . . ” If it is true as plaintiff alleges that defendants did the things outlined in the complaint, e. g., maliciously conspired to obtain false testimony as to criminal offenses, or if one defendant sought to cause a student to seek a false embezzlement warrant against plaintiff, then I believe such actions would clearly be beyond the lawful scope and bounds of his or their “duties.” Such conduct, if true, would be corruption of the worse sort. I do not believe the legislature intended to exempt from civil liability one guilty of such conduct. Unfortunately, there is no legislative history of the act available as an indication.
I recognize that in certain prosecutorial situations there are overriding public policy considerations requiring absolute civil immunity, irrespective of the most heinous alleged misconduct, e. g., the judiciary and public prosecutors. See Imbler v. Pacht man, 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 , 98 S.Ct. 1099 , 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 , 89 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967).
I do not believe these public policy considerations, e. g., harassment by unfounded litigation sufficient to materially affect this quasi-prosecutor’s energy, or the likelihood of a colored opinion because of fear of suit, are present here. Certainly they are not present to nearly the extent as would be true in a criminal matter. A grant of absolute immunity from civil liability, irrespective of how improper or inappropriate one’s actions may be, is a dangerous practice for our system of redress and one that ought be scrupulously limited.
I would not hold that T.C.A. § 49-1416(9) grants absolute immunity. In a case where willfulness, malice or corruption was alleged I would hold that a proper cause of action had been stated.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court and order a trial on the merits.