holding that a factual sufficiency claim that merely includes a general discussion of the evidence but fails to include any argument as to how or why the evidence is insufficient under a factual sufficiency standard is inadequately briefed
How later courts described this case
- holding that a factual sufficiency claim that merely includes a general discussion of the evidence but fails to include any argument as to how or why the evidence is insufficient under a factual sufficiency standard is inadequately briefed
- holding a factual sufficiency claim that merely includes a general discussion of the evidence but fails to include any argument as to how or why the evidence is insufficient under a factual sufficiency standard is inadequately briefed
- holding that “[w]hen a general verdict is returned and the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt under any of the paragraph allegations submitted, the verdict will be upheld”
- holding that merely stating standard of review for determining sufficiency of evidence constitutes inadequate briefing and presents nothing for appellate review
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MANSFIELD, Judge,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the majority but write separately as to the disposition of point of error number fifteen. Appellant avers, in this point of error, the trial court erred in admitting victim impact evidence at the punishment phase. After the trial court overruled appellant’s timely objection, the complainant’s sister testified as to the effects of the complainant’s death on her, her children and her sisters. She testified she was now afraid to go out alone, especially at night, and how much she missed her sister’s love and companionship. Finally, she testified it was important to her and her family to have the complainant’s remains recovered and buried in the family plot.
In Smith v. State, 919 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), a plurality of the Court concluded that testimony by the sister of the victim concerning the victim’s good nature, hobbies and work ethic was not relevant to sentencing and, therefore, should not have been admitted. This evidence concerned primarily the character of the victim, not the effect of her death on her family and friends. However, the Court also held that the erroneous admission of such “victim character” evidence in Smith was harmless because the evidence:
(1)comprised a relatively miniscule portion of the evidence presented at punishment; and
(2) was not emphasized by the State at closing argument; and
(3) given the overwhelming evidence presented that supported the jury’s answers as to the special issues, we concluded the victim impact/eharacter evidence made no contribution to punishment. Tex.R.App.Proc. 81(b)(2).
Smith, supra, 919 S.W.2d at 103 .
The evidence in the present case is more akin to that which we found admissible in Ford v. State, 919 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Rather than being evidence of the character of the complainant, the evidence in the present case related to the impact her death has had on her sister and other persons. Such evidence was found by this Court in Ford to be arguably relevant to the defendant’s moral culpability contained in the mitigation special issue. We concluded the trial court’s decision to admit this testimony was not an abuse of discretion in that such testimony was within the zone of reasonable disagreement as to what constituted evidence relevant to sentence. Id.
In my opinion, the danger of undue prejudice inherent to a defendant in the introduction of ‘Victim impact” evidence is the same, whether the evidence relates to the victim’s character or to the impact his or her death has had on her family and friends. 1 Therefore, I believe the admission of the complainant’s sister’s testimony in the present case, given Smith , was error and should have been subjected to a harm analysis under Tex. RApp.Proc. 81(b)(2). Given the extensive evidence presented at punishment, which overwhelmingly supported the jury’s answers as to the special punishment issues, and the fact the State did not emphasize the sister’s testimony at closing argument, I conclude beyond a reasonable doubt this evidence made no contribution to punishment and its admission was therefore harmless. Harris v. *627 State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587-588 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Smith, supra.
With these comments, I join the opinion of the Court.
. In my concurrence in Smith , I stated my opinion, citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), that victim impact evidence is relevant within the context of the mitigation special issue. Therefore, such evidence should always be admissible, subject to an abuse of discretion standard.