affirming trial court’s holding that no prejudice arose from the court’s erroneous decision to strike a juror for cause
How later courts described this case
- affirming trial court’s holding that no prejudice arose from the court’s erroneous decision to strike a juror for cause
- “a party aggrieved by a trial court’s erroneous decision to strike a juror for cause must establish prejudice in order to be granted relief in the form a new trial.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DISSENTING OPINION BY
FREEDBERG, J.
I agree with the majority that Appellant is not entitled to post trial relief on issues pertaining to the jury’s determination of liability. However, because Appellant was prejudiced by the decision not to allow a postsurgical medical examination and deposition of Appellee’s surgeon, I respectfully dissent and would grant a new trial as to damages.
Both Appellant and Appellee sought leave to depose the surgeon. Appellant also sought a medical examination of Ap-pellee by its expert to evaluate the impact of the surgery. The majority concludes that the trial court had “no legitimate basis” to deny these requests. However, the majority holds that Appellant has not established prejudice. I disagree. At trial, the jury was instructed that it could award damages for the nature and extent of Ap-pellee’s injuries; future pain and suffering; the value of future medical care and supplies; future lost earnings; and future household services. Calculation of the amount of these damages is impacted upon by the result of the surgery. Appellant should have been allowed to depose the surgeon and to have its expert examine Appellee so it could determine whether there was relevant evidence on these damage issues.
To obtain a new trial on damages, the appellant must demonstrate how the alleged trial error caused an incorrect result. Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, 329 Pa.Super. 139 , 478 A.2d 1, 4 (1984). The complained-of ruling must be erroneous and prejudicial to appellant’s case to constitute reversible error. Id. This Court has defined prejudice as “any substantial diminution of a party’s ability to properly present its case at trial.” Florig v. Estate of O’Hara, 912 A.2d 318, 325 (Pa.Su *397 per.2006) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 740 , 929 A.2d 1162 (2007) (table).
In the instant matter, the judge who presided at the trial was not the judge who ruled on Appellant’s motion. The motions judge did not issue an opinion explaining why the requests were denied. In its opinion denying Appellant’s post-trial motions, the trial court states only that Appellant was not prejudiced because it was able to review post-surgical medical records. There is no explanation why the court did not grant a limited delay in commencement of the trial to allow the examination and deposition, given the significance of the Appellee’s damage claims.
At trial, Appellee testified that his pain worsened after the surgery. In response to questioning Appellee stated:
Appellee: I have more neck pain after the surgery.
Counsel: In terms of your range of motion in your neck, are you able to turn your neck to the left?
Appellee: Yes, I can turn to the left.
Counsel: Demonstrate.
Appellee: (Indicating)
Counsel: That type of range of motion, was it limited like that before your surgery?
Appellee: No. I had almost full range of motion.
Counsel: The pain that you have now in your neck, how would you compare that to the pain that you were experiencing in your neck before the surgery? Appellee: The pain I have now is greater than before the surgery.
R.R. at 453-54. Appellant should have been permitted to have him undergo a post-surgical medical examination to test this claim. Appellant should have had the opportunity to ask the surgeon whether the operation had increased Appellant’s pain and limitation of motion.
The majority holds that because Appellant had access to Appellee’s post-surgical medical records, this was sufficient to avoid prejudice. A review of such records is not the equivalent of the opportunity to depose the surgeon and to have a medical examination conducted by Appellant’s medical expert.
In sum, Appellant’s ability to prepare for trial, to cross-examine Appellee and his witnesses, and to plan strategy was prejudiced by the refusal to allow the requested deposition and examination. The ruling substantially diminished Appellant’s ability to properly contest Appellee’s damage claims. Appellant did not have a level playing field.
I would remand to permit the requested discovery and medical examination and for a new trial solely with respect to damages.