holding that the trial court erred in granting 7 summary judgment in favor of party that “was not a party to the summary judgment proceedings”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the trial court erred in granting 7 summary judgment in favor of party that “was not a party to the summary judgment proceedings”
- stating that an interlocutory summary judgment may be made final if the judgment severs the issues and parties that are left unadjudicated
- holding trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of party that ―was not a party to the summary-judgment proceedings‖
- holding that trial court erred in adjudicating rights of party who did not move for summary judgment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by a later decision (1992)
We believe Teer is distinguishable from the present case.
The opinion
ROBERTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. By its decision, the majority is requiring the City of Bel-laire on remand to perform a useless act. In remanding this cause we will needlessly waste the time and effort of the parties and courts involved in this litigation. The merits of this cause, brought forward by Plaintiffs’ appeal of their declaratory judgment action, are properly before the court and should be passed upon.
This is a declaratory judgment action. The single issue raised by Plaintiffs’ complaint was the validity of certain zomng ordinances of the City of Bellaire. The City was joined as a defendant pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Article 2524^-1, Section 11, TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. The summary judgment rendered by the trial court on its face disposed of all parties to the litigation. More importantly, the judgment resolved the only issue in dispute by declaring the City’s ordinances valid.
In urging this Court to reach the merits, the City has argued that remand would only lead to a prompt resubmission of a motion for summary judgment by all the Defendants, which motion would be granted. The salutary principle that summary judgment should not be rendered in favor of a non-movant is, in this case, overshadowed by the policy of expeditious dispute resolution embodied in Rule 166-A, Tex.R. Civ.P., and Article 2524 — 1. The language of the Declaratory Judgment Act is unambiguous: “... such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.” TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 2524-1, § 1. I am of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court is final and appealable and would proceed to resolve the merits of the case.
KILGARLIN, J., joins in this dissent.