noting reargument was granted out of recognition that, prior to sua sponte overruling prior decision and applying new decision retroactively, parties should be afforded opportunity to be heard
How later courts described this case
- noting reargument was granted out of recognition that, prior to sua sponte overruling prior decision and applying new decision retroactively, parties should be afforded opportunity to be heard
- noting that testing the validity of the Superior Court's ruling distinguishing one of our prior cases may entail reviewing the validity of the precedent in question
- “[A]s I have previously expressed, both in gray areas between substance and procedure, and in matters that have not yet been occupied by this Court via its own procedural rules, I would allow some latitude to the Legislature to make rules touching on procedure, so long as such rules are reasonable and do not unduly impinge on this Court’s constitutionally prescribed powers and prerogatives.” (quoting Commonwealth v. McMullen, 599 Pa. 435, 458 , 961 A.2d 842, 856 (2008) (Saylor, J., concurring and dissenting))
- discussing various social phenomena impacting health care providers and their patients in Pennsylvania in terms of risk, cost, access, and quality of care
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN,
dissenting.
I joined the recommendation to grant reargument because I believe the majority opinion reached an incorrect result. The prior majority held the Professional Nursing Law does not prohibit a nurse from giving expert opinion testimony regarding medical causation. In doing so, the majority overruled Flanagan v. Labe, 547 Pa. 254 , 690 A.2d 183 (1997), and did so retroactively. Freed v. Geisinger Medical Center, 601 Pa. 233 , 971 A.2d 1202, 1214 (2009). Furthermore, the majority held the trial court should assess any expert witness’s competency under the standard set forth in Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, Inc., 541 Pa. 474 , 664 A.2d 525, 528 (1995) 1 or under the MCARE Act, if applicable. For the reasons set forth in my prior dissenting opinion, I would reverse the Superior Court and remand for reinstatement of the trial court’s grant of a compulsory non-suit in Petitioners’ favor, pursuant to Flanagan .
Flanagan , which held a nurse is precluded from offering expert opinion testimony regarding a medical diagnosis, deferred to the Professional Nursing Law’s limitations, and acknowledged nurses are “competent to provide expert testimony regarding applicable standards of nursing care.” Flanagan, at 185 (emphasis added). Here, a medical — not a nursing — diagnosis was at issue. The legislature has prohibited nurses from rendering a medical diagnosis in the scope of their profession; accordingly, it simply does not follow a nurse would be qualified to render expert opinion as to a medical diagnosis in a court of law. To allow one to opine in court about things one is explicitly prohibited from opining about in the real professional world is illogical at best.
*254 There is a statute that says one professionally licensed group cannot diagnose that which falls in another area of professional licensure; I fail to see the wisdom of allowing civil claims to be founded upon or supported by such impermissible opinions.
. Miller held a coroner with years of experience had specialized knowledge regarding time of death and qualified as an expert to testify regarding same. Id., at 529 . I find Miller’s general evidentiary considerations easily distinguishable from cases invoking a statutory prohibition.