concurring opinion by Hyde, J.
How later courts described this case
- concurring opinion by Hyde, J.
- "treatment” is applying remedies; the course pursued for remedial purposes
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR TRANSFER TO THE SUPREME COURT
PER CURIAM.
On motion for rehearing, or in the alternative, for transfer to the Supreme Court, Bryant claims that we should have considered whether Sec. 516.280 V.A.M.S. applies to this case. This section provides that “If any person, by absconding or concealing himself, or by any other improper act, prevents the commencement of an action, such action may be commenced within the time herein limited, after the commencement of such action shall have ceased to be so prevented.” (Emphasis supplied.) He says that “The untimely filing of his claim should be excused because of the improper actions of fraud and concealment on the part of the employer, * * * There is no merit in this claim.
In the first place, no such claim was raised in his brief by any sufficient point relied on as required by Civil Rule 83.05. His point relied on reads “The Trial Court Did Not Err in Holding That Respondent’s Claim Was Filed Within the Time Prescribed by Law. (1) Because M.R.S.1959, § 287.430 is a limitation statute operating on the remedy and not on the right itself; therefore must be given a liberal interpretation with the thought in mind toward the public welfare.” This point is wholly abstract and insufficient to present the question Bryant now undertakes to raise. Ambrose v. M.F.A. Co-operative Ass’n, Mo., 266 S.W.2d 647, 650 ; White v. Nelson, Mo.App., 283 S.W.2d 926, 927 . Moreover, under this point he does not even cite Sec. 516.280, V.A.M.S. and in his argument on this point he does not even mention it.
In the second place, a re-examination of his testimony discloses no slightest suggestion that he was asserting he had been prevented from filing his claim within the time fixed by law by any “improper act” or fraud or concealment on the part of the employer or any one else.
In the third place, he made no such claim before the commission. In the written argument he submitted to the commission he said “For the purpose of this review, the sole question submitted to this Commission for consideration and determination, is whether or not the Petitioner filed his claim within the one year period of limitation, i. e., one year after the furnishing of medical aid or payment of benefits.” This was the only question he presented and the *201 only question the commission decided. It is settled that questions which might have been presented to the commission to establish a case or defense cannot be litigated on appeal from its award where a party neglects to present and litigate them originally before the cottimission. Ferguson v. Ozark Distributing Company, 233 Mo.App. 68 , 117 S.W.2d 399, 402 ; Phillips v. Air Reduction Sales Company, 337 Mo. 587 , 85 S.W.2d 551, 559 ; De Puente v. Chevrolet-St. Louis Division of General Motors, Mo.App., 117 S.W.2d 641 , 646; Nichols v. Davidson Hotel Company, Mo.App., 333 S.W.2d 536 . This is an absolute bar to any consideration of Bryant’s present claim.
The motion for rehearing, or in the alternative, for transfer to the Supreme Court is overruled.