noting exception to employment-at-will doctrine "where there is an agreement that the employment is for a specified time, in which case firing may be only for cause, or where an employer's employment manual contains an express provision stating that the employee will only be dismissed for cause and that provision is relied on by the employee."
How later courts described this case
- noting exception to employment-at-will doctrine "where there is an agreement that the employment is for a specified time, in which case firing may be only for cause, or where an employer's employment manual contains an express provision stating that the employee will only be dismissed for cause and that provision is relied on by the employee."
- handbook statement that “in the event it should become necessary to 13 reduce the number of employees in the workplace, employees will be laid off on a seniority basis” was express provision against wrongful discharge that could be relied on by employee
- handbook statement that “in the event it should become necessary to reduce the number of employees in the workplace, employees will be laid off on a seniority basis” was express provision against wrongful discharge that could be relied on by employee
- cautioning that the phrase “meeting of the minds” must be understood under the “objective theory” of Arkansas contract law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. Since 1984, this court has wrestled with the idea of abandoning or modifying the employment at will doctrine. See Gauldin v. Emerson Electric Co., 284 Ark. 149 , 680 S.W.2d 92 (1984), and Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282 Ark. 548 , 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984). That common law doctrine provides that when a contract of employment does not bind the employee to serve for a specified time, the contract may be terminated at will by either party, even though the contract provides that the employee can be discharged only for cause. Gauldin, 284 Ark. at 151 , 680 S.W.2d at 93 . While confronted with a number of opportunities since Gauldin and Jackson to jettison the employment at will doctrine, the court has refused to do so. Smith v. American Greetings Corp., 304 Ark. 596 , 804 S.W.2d 683 (1991); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239 , 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988); Gladden v. Arkansas Childrens’ Hospital, 292 Ark. 130 , 728 S.W.2d 501 (1987); Proctor v. East Central Arkansas EOC, 291 Ark. 265 , 724 S.W.2d 163 (1987); Bryant v. Southern Screw Machine Products Co., 288 Ark. 602 , 707 S.W.2d 321 (1986). However, in Gladden the court modified the at will rule in two respects, viz., (1) where an employee relies upon a personnel manual that contains an express provision against termination except for cause, he or she may not be arbitrarily discharged in violation of such a provision and (2) an employment agreement that contains a provision that the employee will not be discharged except for cause is cognizable even if it has an unspecified term. See Gladden, 292 Ark. at 136 , 728 S.W.2d at 505 . With these two narrow changes, the court reaffirmed its adherence to the employment at will doctrine, and later reiterated that reaffirmation in Smith, 304 Ark. at 600 , 804 S.W.2d at 686 . In each of the foregoing cases, this court decided as a matter of law either that the employee failed to allege a cause of action for wrongful discharge or that the employee failed in his or her proof on summary judgment to support such an action.
As mentioned in the majority opinion, the employees here based their wrongful dismissal claim on Crain Industries’ breach of the following provision in its handbook:
In the event it should be necessary to reduce the number of employees in the work force, employees will be laid off on a seniority basis by department. The last employee hired would be the first to be laid off. 1
The above provision contains no language expressing that the employees cannot be discharged except for cause. The provision provides only that, if a reduction in work force is necessary, employees will be laid off on a seniority basis. Without an express provision against termination except for good cause, Crain Industries clearly reserved its authority to fire any employee for any reason.
Actually, the earlier Gladden decision presented a much closer case on its facts to uphold a wrongful discharge action than the situation here. In Gladden, the employees’ manual contained provisions describing methods for dismissal under certain circumstances and specified different kinds of conduct that could result in summary dismissal. Even so, because the manual did not expressly provide that employees would not be discharged except for cause, this court held as a matter of law that the manual afforded the employee no basis for a wrongful discharge action.
I would point out that, in all of the manual or handbook employment at will cases cited above and of which I have knowledge, this court has never held that a wrongful discharge action was alleged or a claim was established or that a jury question existed. If such an action or claim exists here, no doubt such a factual question existed in Gladden.
In conclusion, I would add that I have sympathy for- the employees’ beliefs that their employer should have complied with its stated policy set out in the company’s handbook when a work force reduction became inevitable. Nonetheless, that is not the issue posed here. The majority’s opinion, in my view, simply runs contrary to this court’s prior decisions, and I fear will prove to be the source of considerable confusion in employment at will cases in the future.
I respectfully dissent.
Corbin, J., joins this dissent. One exception to this policy statement was added, but it is not relevant in this appeal.