The opinion
Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. While the language in Act 797 does not state specifically that the act shall be applied retroactively, it does contain explicit language that can have no other possible intent. Thus it is either expressly stated or necessarily implied, depending on one’s point of view. Section 3 of the act reads in part:
. . . it is the intention of this act to redefine the term “rural community” . . . and to make it applicable to persons who have in the past or now practice medicine in such rural communities', that some doctors have been denied the cancellation of their loans due to the misinterpretation of the law; and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide an equitable remedy to such persons. (My emphasis.)
When the legislative intent to have an enactment operate retroactively is clearly stated, it is the duty of the judicial branch to construe the legislation accordingly. We did that in Forrest City Machine Works v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33 , 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981). The Court of Appeals did the same in Aluminum Co. of America v. Neal, 4 Ark. App. 1 , 626 S.W.2d 620 (1982). Yet neither statute construed in those cases expressly or impliedly suggested retroactive application, we simply chose to construe the acts in that fashion.
Clearly, if Act 797 is to provide the equitable remedy to persons who have in the past practiced medicine in a rural community who are being “denied cancellation of their loans due to misinterpretation of the law,” the act must be given retroactive effect. Under the majority’s interpretation, the purpose and avowed intent of the act is defeated.
The very fact that earlier amendments to Act 131 of 1949 have expressly stated that no provision of the amending act shall be construed as impairing any loan “now outstanding” (See Act 62 of 1972, for example) reinforces the position that Act 797 intends that loans of persons practicing in rural communities of 8,300 and under would be affected by the 1985 amendment. The fact that Act 797 raised the rural community ceiling to 8,300 rather than 9,000 evidences, I believe, that the intent of the legislation was that anyone then practicing in Batesville (or other smaller communities) would benefit under the act.
I am not troubled by the fact that the emergency clause (which is actually part of the act) states that the legislation takes effect at passage. That is the traditional wording of emergency clauses and cannot defeat an intent otherwise stated—that the act have retroactive operation. Act 169 of 1913, for example, provides that it will be construed as having retroactive effect, at the same time stating it will take effect at passage.
As to the argument that legislation cannot impair antecedent rights under a contract it is enough to say that only the rights of the state itself are impaired by Act 797 and it is plain the state is free to impair those if it wishes. Skelton v. B.C. Land Company, Inc., 260 Ark. 122 , 539 S.W.2d 4 (1977).
I believe the trial court ruled correctly and should be affirmed.
Glaze, J., joins in this dissent.