Opinion

Coutlakis v. State

  • 160 Tex. Crim. 249
  • 268 S.W.2d 192
  • 1954 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1907
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Filed
Mar 24, 1954
Status
Published
Author
Graves
On the bench
Woodley, Morrison, Graves
Cited by
11 cases
Authority
More cited than 10.7%

The opinion

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

GRAVES, Presiding Judge.

Appellant renews his complaint relative to the majority opinion in this case and reiterates the contention that the National Labor Relations Board, under the Taft-Hartley Act, has preempted the field herein with reference to the labor organizers’ method of procedure within the different states, and that the state’s statutes here under consideration would be an obstacle or “frustration” to the rights of collective bargaining as controlled by the Federal statutes.

We repeat our statement of the majority opinion that we do not think the case of Garner v. Teamster’s Union, 346 U.S. 485 , would affect the proposition herein present that a labor organizer must obtain a card from the secretary of state under Article 5154(a) of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas.

It is also insisted that the opinion herein erred in its holding that the term “solicit” should not have been defined more *258 clearly in the statute; and it is suggested that there can be no solicitation unless the same of necessity entails the passage of money from the person solicited to the so-called organizer doing the soliciting. The word “solicit” is one of common usage and its meaning is simple and not subject to any peculiar usage. As here used, it means “to entice, to request, to incite” and surely it does not contain the further proposition that it should be a successful solicitation evidenced by the passage of money from one person to another. We do not think this word is vague, indefinite or uncertain, but its import is a matter understood by people who understand the meaning of the language. See Words & Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 39, page 615.

Our opinion is also criticized because of the fact that it was not shown that appellant was a paid employee of a labor union. The opinion clearly sets out the fact that appellant received funds from this union as his first pay check. Unquestionably appellant had a right of free speech, but a free speech must be a proper speech and can be governed by the statutes as is shown by the enactments prohibiting the use of certain language, the abuse of which can be punished under the Penal Code.

Believing the proper disposition of the case to have been made in the original opinion, the motion for rehearing will therefore be overruled.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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