holding in aggravated sexual assault case that testimony regarding psychological trauma suffered by child victim and its physical manifestations properly admitted
How later courts described this case
- holding in aggravated sexual assault case that testimony regarding psychological trauma suffered by child victim and its physical manifestations properly admitted
- holding that victim-impact evidence is admissible in a non-capital case when it has some bearing on defendant’s personal responsibility and moral guilt
- holding that relevant victim impact evidence may include the physical, psychological, or economic effects of a crime on victim or victim’s family
- holding victim impact evidence in aggravated sexual assault case admissible as circumstance of offense when it has some bearing on defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BAIRD, Judge,
concurring.
This petition for discretionary review was granted to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that “testimony concerning the effect of a sexual assault is relevant and admissible in evidence at the punishment phase of a trial in contravention of the dictates of Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.07.” This ground is controlled by our opinion in Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), wherein this Court held that evidence of the circumstances of the offense itself, or the defendant himself, will be admissible at the punishment phase. Id., at 896 . Specifically, Miller-El stands for the proposition that the long lasting effects suffered by a victim are admissible at the punishment phase of a trial. Id. Pursuant to Miller-El , evidence in the instant case of the child-victim’s ongoing and possible future psychological trauma was undoubtedly admissible at the punishment phase of appellant’s trial. Because Miller-El is so clear *80 ly dispositive of this cause, I consider this petition for discretionary review to have been improvidently granted.
While victim impact evidence is clearly admissible, I do not, however, endorse the broad language expressed by the majority concerning the admissibility of evidence of psychological trauma experienced by the victim’s mother, Stavinoha, slip op. at 4-5, because such evidence typically falls beyond the scope of “circumstances of the offense.” Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44, 63 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (opinion on reh'g); Stiehl v. State, 585 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). 1 In the instant case, however, I construe the evidence of the mother’s trauma admissible due to the psychological testimony concerning the “interacting cycle” or “spiraling cycle” between the victim’s emotions and those of his mother’s. Stavinoha, slip op. at 2.
This case was tried before the 1989 amendment to art. 37.07 § 3(a), which now permits evidence to be admitted at the punishment phase “as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing.” See Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 785, p. 3492, § 4.04, eff. Sept. 1, 1989. However, the law in effect at the time of appellant’s trial permitted only introduction of the defendant’s prior criminal record, his general reputation and his character. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.07. Accordingly, I feel the majority opinion should not be construed as a comment on art. 37.07 as amended.
With these comments, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
. The United States Supreme Court has prohibited the introduction of evidence of impact on the victim’s family in the punishment phase of capital trials. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 , 107 S.Ct. 2529 , 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987).