defining a “formation” in the context of an oil-and-gas lease as a “succession of sedimentary beds that were deposited continuously and under the same general conditions . . . usually named for the town or area in which the [formation was] first recognized and described”
How later courts described this case
- defining a “formation” in the context of an oil-and-gas lease as a “succession of sedimentary beds that were deposited continuously and under the same general conditions . . . usually named for the town or area in which the [formation was] first recognized and described”
- holding lease of only oil and casinghead gas did not convey ownership of other gas or liquids that became mixed with product stream during production
- concluding that a suit to enjoin trespass by "sand fracking" could proceed in a judicial forum
- indicating that the Railroad Commission can determine for regulatory purposes who has the right to drill a well, but leaving the question of who owns the gas to the courts
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting opinions by
Justices GONZALEZ and MAUZY.
Justice HIGHTOWER not sitting.
MAUZY, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with the Court’s decision to remand this cause to the trial court in the interest of justice. Amarillo Oil freely chose the legal theory, whether correct or incorrect, on which it proceeded at trial. It requested the questions submitted to the jury, it introduced evidence regarding those questions, and it received answers from the jury regarding those questions. Unfortunately for Amarillo Oil, the jury’s answers were not favorable. Plainly, on the record before it, the trial court rendered a correct judgment. Such “an errorless judgment ... cannot be reversed in the interest of justice.” Uselton v. State, 499 S.W.2d 92, 99 (Tex.1973). I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.