Opinion

Ex Parte Krupps

  • 712 S.W.2d 144
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Filed
Jun 11, 1986
Status
Published
Author
Miller
On the bench
Davis, Onion, Clinton, Teague, Campbell, McCormick, White, Miller
Cited by
23 cases

explaining that constructive contempt adjudications satisfy due process if the con-temnor is given notice, a hearing, and the opportunity to obtain an attorney

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that constructive contempt adjudications satisfy due process if the con-temnor is given notice, a hearing, and the opportunity to obtain an attorney
  • party held in contempt for refusing to obey order of bailiff even though the judge had left the courtroom
  • "The Court has general and unlimited jurisdiction to issue original writs of habeas corpus in all cases, including those of a civil nature."
  • criminal contempt “can be broken into two specific acts: 1

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

MILLER, Judge,

dissenting.

I join Judge Campbell’s dissent and further disagree with the majority opinion’s handling of appellant’s final argument by stating:

“Even if the rising requirement created a burden on applicants’ religious freedom, Judge Floyd removed the burden by giving them the option of remaining outside until after court convened.”

At 151. I would reach the merits of applicant Krupps’ complaint about burdening his religious freedom and, under these facts, decide against him.

It occurs to me that the majority’s reasoning concerning alternative choice as a substitute for the exercise of a constitutional right suffers from the same flaw as “separate but equal” thinking or providing that certain people can ride the bus but only if they sit in the back (I’m not going to even mention the “moment of silence” as an alternative to school prayer controversy). Granted, we are talking about the balance of least intrusive means of infringing on a constitutional right in favor of courtroom decorum and the relationship of that balance to the concept of direct contempt, not just the right to exercise the constitutional right. Still the two are so intertwined that the mere fact that an alternative was given in this case does not justify the majority’s cursory dismissal of applicant’s claim that the balance of right versus decorum should be tipped in his favor.

I dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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