right-to-work law held to prohibit contract requiring all employees to pay pro rata share of bargaining and grievance costs
How later courts described this case
- right-to-work law held to prohibit contract requiring all employees to pay pro rata share of bargaining and grievance costs
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
George Rose Smith, J., dissenting. In the construction industry a contractor must utilize the skills of maiiy specialized craftsmen, such as bricklayers, concrete finisliers, plumbers, electricians, painters, roofers, etc., but most of them work upon a particular job for only a few days or even a few hours. It is plain enough that a small contractor cannot maintain upon his payroll, as full-time employees, all these specialists. Hence it is desirable that some central labor pool be maintained, so that each contractor can call for the various skilled workmen as he needs them. Such an arrangement is not only advantageous to the contractors; it also affords the workmen access to whatever jobs are available in their field. Hence the hiring hall fills a definite need in the building industry. According to this record, the electrical workers ’ union maintains the only existing hiring hall in this craft in Pulaski county. No other agency, public or private, has undertaken to perform this necessary function in the construction business.
The union sought to include in its labor contract a provision for the recognition and continued existence of this hiring hall. The contract was fair on its face, in that it permitted the employer to reject any applicant for employment. Certainly the proposed contract met the standards suggested for such agreements in National Labor Rel. Board v. Mountain Pac. Chap. of Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 9th Cir., 270 F. 2d 425 .
It is obviously possible that the hiring hall might be conducted with discrimination, so that non-union electricians would not be given equal opportunities for employment.. But this record contains not a sentence, not a word, not a syllable, of testimony to show that this •hiring hall is to be used as an instrument of discrimination. I am very much afraid that the effect of the majority opinion is to outlaw the hiring hall, a useful device, in all instances, even though the terms of the proposed contract appear to be wholly fair and nondiscriminatory. For these reasons I would reverse the decree.