stating that procedures used were "shocking and . . . at variance with our conception of the minimum requirements of fair play, within the meaning of due process law"
How later courts described this case
- stating that procedures used were "shocking and . . . at variance with our conception of the minimum requirements of fair play, within the meaning of due process law"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
COLEMAN, Justice
(concurring opinion).
The statute under consideration provides-no rules governing the procedure to be followed in the court of inquiry. Each justice of the peace is free to adopt his own rules, subj ect only to the constitutionally protected rights of the individual. While courts ordinarily are free to adopt rules of procedure where none are established by law, it would *640 appear that, at a minimum, some guide lines should be provided for justices of the peace, many of whom are not well grounded in law. The procedure adopted in this case is essentially the same as that customarily used in this State. This procedure provides no protection for the reputations of persons unjustly accused. In this age of mass communication the testimony developed at a court of inquiry is immediately made known to all prospective jurors. It is the purpose of the law that the only testimony produced would be that tending to establish that an offense has been, or is about to be, committed. There is danger that the fairness of a subsequent trial would be adversely affected by such publicity.
I find, however, no constitutional inhibition against such public investigations, even where damage results to the reputations of those against whom no complaint is ever filed. If the testimony of a single witness establishes, in the opinion of the justice of the peace, the commission of an offense, a complaint must be filed. The accused then is afforded an opportunity to rebut these charges. If the testimony merely imputes criminal misconduct, or negligent conduct, not made criminal by statute, no opportunity to clear his reputation is afforded the person accused. Obviously opportunity for abuse of power is presented, particularly in the absence of rules of procedure.
It may reasonably be argued that by reason of the publicity engendered by a court of inquiry, evidence is procured which might not be discovered by a secret investigation. This possible benefit to society in the administration of justice should be weighed against the possible harm resulting to individuals. While we may feel that the law as now written is essentially unfair and is not a wise exercise of the powers of government, the wisdom of the legislative body in enacting the statute can only be judged by a subsequent legislature and the question of the essential fairness of the act within the meaning of the due process clause of the Constitution has been ■ answered by the Supreme Court of Texas m Ex parte Jimenez, 159 Tex. 183 , 317 S.W.2d 189 .
I concur in the opinion delivered by BELL, C. J.