holding that it was permissible for trial court to dismiss indictment based on “prosecutorial misconduct” when a defendant’s right to counsel was impaired
How later courts described this case
- holding that it was permissible for trial court to dismiss indictment based on “prosecutorial misconduct” when a defendant’s right to counsel was impaired
- rejecting State's argument that dismissal was improper under Johnson and that lack of precedent precludes a violation of a particular constitutional right as a basis for dismissing a charging instrument with prejudice
- holding that “dismissal of an indictment . . . may be necessary to adequately protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel”
- explaining that when charges are dismissed, the parties are no longer in legally adversarial positions
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*333 KELLER, Judge,
dissenting.
I part company with the majority and concurring opinions over one issue: whether the trial court had authority to dismiss the indictment against appellee without the consent of the state. Because I believe that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do so, I dissent.
In State v. Johnson, 821 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), this Court addressed the specific question of whether a court has any authority to dismiss a criminal case without the prosecutor’s consent. Recognizing that a court’s authority to act is limited to those actions authorized by constitution, statute, or common law, we stated:
[W]e find no statutory or constitutional provision which would imply a court’s authority to dismiss a case without the State’s consent, in contravention of the common law. In sum, there is no general authority, written or unwritten, inherent or implied, which would permit a trial court to dismiss a ease without the prosecutor’s consent.
Johnson, id., at 618 .
Because the trial court lacked the authority to dismiss the indictment without the consent of the State, I respectfully dissent.
MeCORMICK, P.J., and WHITE and MANSFIELD, JJ., join.