Opinion

Armstrong v. State

  • 897 S.W.2d 361
  • 1995 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 34
  • 1995 WL 131964
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Filed
Mar 29, 1995
Status
Published
Author
Overstreet
On the bench
Baird, Overstreet, Maloney, Baird'S
Cited by
162 cases

holding that the jury selection process is designed to insure that an intelligent, alert, disinterested, impartial, and truthful jury will perform the duty assigned to it

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the jury selection process is designed to insure that an intelligent, alert, disinterested, impartial, and truthful jury will perform the duty assigned to it
  • holding that there was no error where counsel did not ask question that would uncover juror = s close friendship with prosecutor
  • recognizing that defense counsel has burden to ask questions to determine a juror’s potential bias
  • stating that “defense counsel has an obligation to ask questions calculated to bring out that information which might be said to indicate a juror’s inability to be impartial and truthful”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

OVERSTREET, Judge,

dissents with the following note:

I suppose one could play on words as the majority apparently approves of to the infringement of an accused right to fair trial; however I refuse to do so. The facts of the voir dire proceeding are not in dispute and *374 well chronicled in the majority opinion and dissenting opinion.

The central issue in this case is whether the presiding juror and the elected prosecutor had a relationship that in all candor should have been disclosed to the defense. If there is a requirement to be candid and above board, the answer is yes. If trial by ambush is allowed and out of town lawyers can be hoodwinked, then sadly the answer is no.

Without question the conduct of the lawyer representing the accused would have been different if the relationship had been revealed. The record reflects that the juror would have been challenged for cause and failing success there, peremptorily struck.

The juror’s explanation as to why she did not reveal the relationship is weak at best, the prosecutor’s, because as an officer of the court has a greater responsibility, should be condemned.

With these comments I dissent to the majority and otherwise join the dissenting opinion.

MALONEY, J., joins Parts I and II of Judge BAIRD’s dissenting opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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