entry into home for purposes of executing a search warrant by agent posing as pizza delivery person was constitutional
How later courts described this case
- entry into home for purposes of executing a search warrant by agent posing as pizza delivery person was constitutional
- holding ruse entry is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to execute a warrant
- "When the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, as we conclude they are herein, the question necessarily becomes, ‘whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated!,]’ ” citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), in which the United States Supreme Court stated that the trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause was subject to de novo review even though findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence.
- "[F]ederal and state courts in interpreting either knock and announce statutes or the common law knock and announce rule are in general agreement that there is no constitutional impediment to the use of subterfuge. Entry gained through the use of deception, accomplished without force, is not a `breaking' requiring officers to first announce their authority and purpose."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STUMBO, Justice,
dissents.
Respectfully, I must dissent. This opinion will send the message that officers seeking to execute a search warrant no longer must evaluate the circumstances surrounding execution for exigent circumstances. Simply pretend to be the pizza man or the Avon lady, it says. Once the door is opened to the ruse, announce your true identity and all is well. Never mind that in the future, the nervous homeowner, who may well have some nefarious activity ongoing, may decide that any erroneously directed delivery person is a disguised law enforcement officer and react with tragic results.
The United States Supreme Court has defined the circumstances requiring a knock- and-announce entry into a private residence. Exigent circumstances have likewise been the subject of much legal writing. This case falls within none of the exceptions set forth in those opinions and simply serves to demonstrate that the Court’s reverence for the sanctity of the individual’s home is no longer of paramount importance in the Commonwealth. I cannot agree with the majority and dread the day when fruits of this opinion arrive for this Court’s review.
STEPHENS, C.J., joins.