holding that reference to plea negotiations was subject to exclusion under Rule 403 since any minimal relevance it may have had in that case was substantially outweighed by the danger of both unfair prejudice and of misleading the jury
How later courts described this case
- holding that reference to plea negotiations was subject to exclusion under Rule 403 since any minimal relevance it may have had in that case was substantially outweighed by the danger of both unfair prejudice and of misleading the jury
- noting that State has right during closing argument to “attack the veracity of a defendant who takes the stand”
- holding that evidence of a plea offer by the State may be relevant, but is substantially outweighed by the danger of both unfair prejudice and of misleading the jury
- holding that no equal protection violation occurred because appellant failed to establish that classification discriminated against similarly-situated individuals
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part by Tennard v. Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, 542 U.S. 274 (2004)
See Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838, 842 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), overruled in part by Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 283-89, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004).
The opinion
*857 MANSFIELD, Judge,
concurring.
Appellant argues that in light of Simmons v. South Carolina, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2187 , 129 L.Ed.2d 138 (1994), the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that the jury in a capital murder case be told how much time the defendant will be required to serve in the event he is sentenced to life in prison rather than to death.
It is important to note that Simmons is a collection of five separate opinions and there is no majority opinion. As such, the prece-dential value of Simmons is limited, though it is fair to conclude that it would apply to Texas if the alternative to the death sentence in a capital murder case here were life in prison without parole. Since that is not true under current Texas law, Simmons, in my opinion, is not applicable.
The Texas Legislature has established the procedure to be followed once an individual is convicted of capital minder. Tex.Code Crim. Proc.Art. 37.071 (as amended, effective for offenses committed on or after September 1, 1991). The Legislature has also determined that the jury in a capital case is not to be charged as to the law relating to parole and/or good time in any case in which the defendant has been convicted of a capital felony. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Art. 37.07, § 4 (1994). Given this clear expression of legislative intent, it is my opinion that it would be inappropriate for this Court to substitute its own judgment and overrule Art. 37.07, § 4, absent clear direction from the Supreme Court that we must do so. In my opinion, Simmons is not that clear direction.
Subject to the comments above, I join the opinion of the Court but only concur with the disposition of point of error number nine.