holding that a statute authorizing a navigation district to "sue and be sued" waived immunity
How later courts described this case
- holding that a statute authorizing a navigation district to "sue and be sued" waived immunity
- holding that Chapter 504 waives the governmental immunity of political subdivisions for retaliatory discharge claims under Chapter 451
- concluding that the legislature must have intended to waive immunity because the provisions of the anti‑retaliation law are not susceptible to any sensible construction absent that conclusion
- holding perfect clarity is not required to establish waiver if a “statute leaves no reasonable doubt of its pui’pose” and therefore concluding the Legislature must have intended to waive immunity because it could discern “no other sensible construction” of section 3(a)(5) of the Political Subdivisions Law
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Travis Central Appraisal District v. Norman
898 S.W.2d 288, 297 (Tex. 1995), superseded by statute as stated in Manbeck v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 381 S.W.3d 528, 532
Disagreed with by Carol Ann Milner v. City of Leander Axia Services, Inc. And Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental RiskPool (2000)
We disagree with Milner's reading of Barfield.
The opinion
GONZALEZ, Justice,
dissenting.
As the Court recognizes, the City of La Porte is immune from liability for the retaliatory discharge of its employees unless that immunity has been waived by the legislature. It may be good public policy to subject governmental entities to liability for retaliating against their employees who file workers compensation claims, but this decision rests solely with the legislature. For the legislature to waive sovereign immunity, it must affirmatively do so by clear and unambiguous language. See Texas Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 447 (Tex.1995) (Gonzalez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1993); Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex.1989); Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex.1980). Because the legislature has not met this standard, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals *300 and render judgment in both eases that plaintiffs take nothing.