explaining that an appellate court generally may not reverse and render judgment on excluded evidence and that evidence cannot be deemed conclusive in a legal-sufficiency review unless it was actually admitted and the opposing party failed to rebut it
How later courts described this case
- explaining that an appellate court generally may not reverse and render judgment on excluded evidence and that evidence cannot be deemed conclusive in a legal-sufficiency review unless it was actually admitted and the opposing party failed to rebut it
- holding that alleged fraudulent misrepresentations regarding the value of an unliquidated tort claim were not actionable as a matter of law because they were nonactionable expressions of opinion
- holding that an Insurance Code suit under the DTPA § 17.46(b) (23) and an uncon-scionability claim under the DTPA § 17.50(a)(3) were not available to Faircloth because there was no evidence that she was a consumer
- explaining that a court may consider a statement of opinion as an actionable statement of fact if it is made by one who should know another party is justifiably relying on the speaker's superior knowledge
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SPECTOR, Justice,
dissenting.
The record in this case contains more than a scintilla of evidence that Transport Insurance Company defrauded Paula Faircloth in the course of settling her claim arising from the death of her mother and stepfather. For that reason, I would modify the judgment of the court of appeals to allow Faircloth to recover on the basis of common-law fraud.