The opinion
Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. I take exception to that part of the decision holding that this case must be transferred to equity because a court of law has no jurisdiction to order the appellees to deliver the ASCS check to the court. Clearly the circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties and I believe it has the inherent power to issue such orders in the exercise of its jurisdiction as may be necessary to effect full relief. See, Pinckney v. Mass Merchandisers, Inc., 16 Ark. App. 151 , 698 S.W.2d 310 (1985); Daley v. Digby, Judge, 272 Ark. 267 , 613 S.W.2d 589 (1981); Ark. State Police Comm’n v. Davidson, 252 Ark. 137 , 477 S.W.2d 852 (1972) (Fogleman, J., conc.); Dobbins Brothers v. Anderson, County Judge, 199 Ark. 635 , 135 S.W.2d 325 (1940); Lane v. Alexander, 168 Ark. 700 , 271 S.W. 710 (1925).
In Pinckney, for example, a breach of contract case, the circuit court ordered the defendant to allow the plaintiff to repossess certain property. The attack on the circuit court’s jurisdiction to make such an order was found to be without merit. The Court of Appeals noted that injunctive relief was not solely within the jurisdiction of the chancery court, and, as stated in a concurring opinion, once the circuit court had acquired jurisdiction of the contract action, it could also issue any necessary injunctive relief, citing Daley v. Digby, supra.
In Lane v. Alexander, supra, the circuit court, much like the case before us, ordered the defendant to jail until he delivered up property belonging to the plaintiff. In affirming, we said:
‘A court having jurisdiction to render a judgment or decree, has authority and jurisdiction,’ it is said in R.C.L., supra, ‘to make such orders and issue such writs as may be necessary and essential to carry the judgment or decree into effect and render it binding and operative.’ This power was recognized by the decision of this court in Meeks v. State, 80 Ark. 579 , where we upheld an order of the chancery court committing the appellant for contempt on account of failure to comply with an order of the court for the delivery of property. That was an order made by the chancery court, but there is no distinction between the inherent powers of courts of superior jurisdiction in regard to the enforcement of their judgments. Courts of chancery afford peculiar remedies not available at law, but the power to enforce a decree or judgment inheres in all courts of superior jurisdiction, regardless of the peculiar remedies which may be offered by each.
The rule is defined in 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 11, p. 737:
A court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as incidental to its general jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in the case before it. In the exercise of this power, a court may, when it is necessary in order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction, and to make its judgment effective, grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal action.
The majority relies on Morgan Utilities, Inc. v. Perry, 183 Ark. 542 , 37 S.W.2d 74 (1931), which, in response to a challenge to chancery court’s jurisdiction, said only that it was clear chancery had jurisdiction of the matter under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-66-418 (1987). The court in Morgan did not hold, nor was the question before it, that jurisdiction was exclusive in that court.
Monette Road Imp. Dist. v. Dudley, 144 Ark. 169 , 222 S.W. 69 (1920), cited in the concurring opinion, also deals with jurisdiction of the subject matter and does not hold that circuit court, where it has jurisdiction, may not issue affirmative orders ancillary to its jurisdiction. In fact, dictum in the Monette opinion pointedly recognizes that possibility:
If the [circuit] court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause on the facts stated and grant the relief sought, it could temporarily stay proceedings by injunction as an incident to the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Moreover, ARCP Rule 65(a)(2)(c) expressly provides that when a court issues a temporary injunction it may be made permanent upon good cause shown.
Admittedly, actions for an injunction are of equitable cognizance, but it does not follow that a court of law, having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, may not in furtherance of that jurisdiction issue such orders as are necessary to grant complete relief.
I would affirm the circuit court.
Purtle, J., joins this dissent.