holding, in original mandamus proceeding, that trial court’s erroneous sanctions order—prohibiting relator from offering evidence, questioning witnesses, or arguing to jury about reasonableness of real party in interest’s medical expenses—precluded relator “from engaging in meaningful adversarial adjudication of [real party in interest’s] claim for payment of medical expenses, vitiating or severely compromising [relator’s] defense” and thus entitling relator to mandamus relief
How later courts described this case
- holding, in original mandamus proceeding, that trial court’s erroneous sanctions order—prohibiting relator from offering evidence, questioning witnesses, or arguing to jury about reasonableness of real party in interest’s medical expenses—precluded relator “from engaging in meaningful adversarial adjudication of [real party in interest’s] claim for payment of medical expenses, vitiating or severely compromising [relator’s] defense” and thus entitling relator to mandamus relief
- holding that, to show remedy by appeal is inadequate, relator must show that its ability to present viable claim or defense at trial is vitiated or severely compromised by erroneous discovery order by “the effective denial of a reasonable opportunity to develop the merits of his or her case, so that the trial would be a waste of judicial resources.”
- stating that with respect to resolution of factual issues, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, and that the relator must establish that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision
- holding that without the statement of facts from the evidentiary hearing on the movant=s motion to compel production, the reviewing court could not determine on what basis the trial judge and the special master reached their conclusions
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GAMMAGE, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. Today’s decision departs from previous instances where this court has provided mandamus relief to correct a wrongful denial of discovery, and labors too hard to conclude that appeal is an adequate remedy for a party who is denied adequate discovery.
I would hold that mandamus is available to correct a trial court error which negatively and materially affects the right of aggrieved parties to adequately present their cases, whether the particular party is seeking discovery or resisting it. See Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 368 , 311 S.W.2d 648, 652 (1958); see also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Interlocutory Review of Discovery Orders: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 44 Sw.L.J. 1045 (1990). In the case before us, the trial court’s denial of discovery has a material and adverse effect on the Walkers’ ability to present their case. The information they seek could impugn the credibility of key expert witnesses at trial. Because their medical malpractice claim, like all such claims, will likely stand or fall on the credibility of the expert witnesses, I would hold that the Walkers are entitled to the information they seek, and that relief by appeal is inadequate.
Discovery is the “linchpin of the search for truth,” and “[ajffording parties full discovery promotes the fair resolution of disputes by the judiciary.” State v. Lowry, 802 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex.1991). Today the court removes and disposes of that “linchpin” and abandons enforcement of fair and adequate discovery. Because I believe that mandamus relief should be readily available when a court allows either too much or too little discovery, I dissent.