reserving for future consideration the applicability of the forgiveness statute to removal actions brought under Tex. Const, art. V § 1-a
How later courts described this case
- reserving for future consideration the applicability of the forgiveness statute to removal actions brought under Tex. Const, art. V § 1-a
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SAM D. JOHNSON,
concurring.
This writer concurs in the result reached by the majority that Judge Bates be re *437 moved from office. This writer does not agree, however, that the so-called “forgiveness doctrine” should be reserved for future consideration. The forgiveness doctrine is strongly urged by Judge Bates; it should be considered and it should be forthrightly rejected.
The majority accurately states that Article 5986 is not applicable to removal cases of this nature. Tex.Const. art. V, § 1-a. The forgiveness doctrine, a shield for judicial officers, was originated by this court as a judicial concept in In re Laughlin, 153 Tex. 183 , 265 S.W.2d 805 (1954). In subsequent cases, In re Brown, 512 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.1974), and Matter of Carrillo, 542 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.1976), this court analyzed the doctrine and found it was not applicable. In each instance this court stated that even if the doctrine were applicable it would not alter the outcome. Likewise, in the instant case the majority states:
“We reserve for future consideration any application of the policy in cases of removal brought under Article V, Section 1-a, Tex.Const.
“Without holding that the legislative policy is also applicable to these proceedings under Article Y, Section 1-a, this court has twice found (Brown and Carrillo, supra ) that even if the policy announced in In re Laughlin, supra, were applicable, it would not affect the outcome of the case in question. The same is true here.”
Judge Bates strongly urges the forgiveness doctrine here. It is the judgment of this writer that it is not only before the court for consideration, but also that the doctrine should be totally rejected.
The doctrine has been unequivocally rejected by the voters of Texas and by the Legislature. The enactment by the Legislature and the approval by the voters of Texas of Article V, Section 1-a, of the Texas Constitution reflects the considered judgment of the people that a commission consisting of justices of the courts of civil appeals, district court judges, licensed attorneys, and lay citizens would be the best body to ascertain the fitness of a member of the judiciary to continue to hold office. Such a commission is designed so that it might dispose of disciplinary matters with reasonable expediency. It was created by the people for the purpose of conducting an in-depth analysis of the fitness of an individual to hold an office of public trust. The people entrusted the commission with the authority to recommend to the Texas Supreme Court that a sitting judge be removed from office. As noted in the commentary to Article 15, Section 6, of the Texas Constitution:
“The Supreme Court is . closely associated with the problems of administering justice, and is confronted daily by problems of judicial ethics which gives it the proper appreciation of the conduct of any judge accused of malfeasance in office . . ..”
The people have delegated to the Judicial Qualifications Commission and to the Texas Supreme Court the authority to remove a member of the judiciary. The people have not seen fit to restrict this delegation of authority by a doctrine of forgiveness. This court should not foster a doctrine contrary to the method formulated for the removal of judicial officers in the Constitution. Therefore, this court should unequivocally reject the doctrine of forgiveness with respect to the judiciary.