The opinion
OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ODOM, Judge.
On original submission appellant’s conviction was reversed for the asking of an improper question by the prosecutor on cross-examination of a reputation witness. The question asked was:
“Have you heard that on September 18th of 1973, that he robbed a woman by the name of Francis Tindall, at the Globe Cleaners at 2430 North Haskell Avenue with a firearm.”
The majority on original submission found that this question, although framed in the approved “have you heard” form, was improper because it implied the act was actually committed, as was the case in Webber v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 472 S.W.2d 136 ; Pitcock v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 204 , 324 S.W.2d 855 ; and Wharton v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 326 , 248 S.W.2d 739 . On rehearing we find the questions asked in those cases to be distinguishable from the one asked here.
In Webber the question asked was, “[HJave you heard that Mr. Webber was expelled from Baylor University, when he was caught shoplifting ?” In Pitcock the questions were, “I will ask you if you have heard during your discussions there about this boy’s reputation, about the trouble that he had concerning a DWI conviction in Stephens County in 1953 ?”; “Have you heard them discuss the trouble that he was in in 1951 concerning a DWI conviction in Taylor County, Texas ?” and “Have you ever heard during these discussions anything concerning the trouble that the defendant was in Wayne Pitcock in 1953 concerning a DWI conviction in Stephens County?” The question in Wharton was, “Have you heard that he is under another indictment for rape in a separate case on a separate woman that occurred eight days after this one ?” (Emphasis added throughout.)
In each of these earlier cases the question was improper, not for excessive detail in describing the rumored event inquired about, but because the question, properly begun, went off-course before its completion by the use of other words in the middle of the question that had the effect of negating the unassertive “have you heard,” and replacing it with words asserting the matter as fact. In Webber it was the added-on phrase, “when he was caught shoplifting.” In Pitcock it was the use of the phrase, “the trouble that he was in,” or “the trouble that he had.” In Wharton the words “that occurred” injected an assertion of fact.
Of course, every case turns on its own facts, and issues, both of whether the question is objectionable and, if so, of whether it may be cured by an instruction to disregard, must be decided after an examination of the circumstances presented. In Carey v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 537 S.W.2d 757 , we overruled language in Parasco v. State, 323 S.W.2d 257 , that stated an instruction to disregard could not render harmless an improper question in this line of cross-examination. In Pitcock and Wharton the objections were overruled by the trial court, but in Webber the objection was sustained and the jury instructed to disregard. Thus, in addition to the question in this case being distinguishable from those in Pitcock, Wharton and Webber , the holding in Webber was itself put in question by the decision in Carey. 1 There is no per se reversible error rule in this area of the law, but today it is enough to say that no error was committed. In contrast to the questions in Webber, Pitcock and Wharton , the one in the instant case did not inject an assertion of fact.
Including details of a “have you heard” question does not create an implica *443 tion of fact. Such questions have been upheld against like attack in prior decisions, such as, Villarriel v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 654 , 295 S.W.2d 222 , and Uresti v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 189 , 319 S.W.2d 340 . In Ur-esti the question, “[H]ave you heard that Raul Uresti and one Frank Guerrero broke into the Lackland Drive-In Theater on the 26th day of June, 1956?” was held proper despite the details of the rumored event included in the question. In Villarriel on motion for rehearing several questions were upheld as not constituting a direct charge that the incident occurred. The most detailed of those questions, was, “Have you heard that either the night before or within two or three nights before he was arrested on February 2, 1956, that he took a fourteen year-old white girl out in the country and kept her out in the country all night in his car?” The question in the instant case contains no more excessive detail than those approved in Uresti and Villarriel , and does not constitute a direct charge that the incident occurred. We hold the question in this case was not improper.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted and our prior judgment of reversal is set aside. We will now address appellant’s remaining grounds of error.
In his second ground of error appellant challenges a question put to him on cross-examination that inquired into the facts surrounding another offense. Appellant had first testified on direct examination that he did not commit the other offense and that he was over 300 miles away when it was committed. Having first testified about the facts surrounding that offense, the State could cross-examine him on the same subject. The ground of error is overruled.
In his next two grounds of error, appellant complains of prosecutorial jury argument. In one instance no ruling was secured on the objection, and in the other appellant received all the relief he requested. Nothing is presented for review.
Finally, appellant complains of a question put to a probation officer on cross-examination by the State. The record, reflecting the close of direct examination by appellant’s counsel through the question challenged on appeal and its answer, is as follows:
“Q. Now, in the event that a person receives, let’s say an eight year sentence or a ten year sentence — let’s say a ten year sentence and that sentence is probated, and that eight or nine years from the date of the probation, that probation is revoked. What is the length of sentence that the offender is sentenced to in the penitentiary?
“A. Ten years.
“Q. In other words, he does it all even though he may have almost lived out the probation; is that correct?
“A. That is correct.
“MR. KINNE: I am going to object to the word, ‘does it all.’
“THE COURT: Overruled.
“MR. GAY: Pass the witness.
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. KINNE:
“Q. Now, Mr. Taylor, if this individual that Mr. Gay has talked to you about had his probation revoked, you don’t mean to say — when he said, ‘does it all,’ you don’t mean to say that he goes down there and serves ten years—
“MR. GAY: Excuse me, Your Honor. I object to that. That is something that is not a proper question for examination before the jury, and the law does not permit a delving into that subject before the jury.
“MR. KINNE: He ask [sic] it.
“THE COURT: I am going to sustain the objection unless this witness has shown that he has expertise in the field.
“Q. (By Mr. Kinne): Well, do you know how much time an individual serves, yourself, on a ten year sentence?
“MR. GAY: To which I object, Your-Honor.
“THE COURT: On what grounds?
“MR. GAY: On the grounds — may I approach the bench with Mr. Kinne?
“THE COURT: Yes, sir.
*444 (WHEREUPON, counsel approached the bench and a discussion was had out of the hearing of the jury and the court reporter)
“THE COURT: I will sustain that objection.
“Q. (By Mr. Kinne): Alright, Mr. Taylor. With regard to Mr. Gay’s request using the words ‘does it all,’ referring to a ten year sentence, how much time — how much of that sentence he actually served may be left in ten years? Depends upon what the Board of Pardons and Paroles in Austin, Texas decides; is that correct?
“A. That is correct. It could be less, yes.”
In his brief appellant acknowledges that no objection was made to the question, but urges fundamental error in light of the court’s instructions. It will be noticed that the discussion at the bench was not recorded. Because no objection was raised to the last question, and objections to both prior questions were sustained, we will not presume that the third question was in violation of whatever ruling and instructions may have been given at the bench discussion, and we will not find bad faith. No adverse ruling was secured throughout this line of questioning.
The ground of error is overruled.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted and the judgment is affirmed.
ROBERTS and PHILLIPS, JJ., dissent.
. Carey , however, did not overrule Webber outright. Compare the instructions to disregard given in each of those cases. A careful trial judge seeking to remove the harmful effect of an improper question should give a thorough instruction to disregard as was done in Carey . See also the concurring opinion in Carey, at 759.