holding that the PSC had the authority to hear 15 a class action involving allegations of violating the “least-cost gas purchasing statute,” although such a power is not specifically enumerated in section 23-3-119, because such a claim would necessarily affect numerous ratepayers, and it was “logical” to conclude that the legislature intended for the Commission to have the authority to hear such actions
How later courts described this case
- holding that the PSC had the authority to hear 15 a class action involving allegations of violating the “least-cost gas purchasing statute,” although such a power is not specifically enumerated in section 23-3-119, because such a claim would necessarily affect numerous ratepayers, and it was “logical” to conclude that the legislature intended for the Commission to have the authority to hear such actions
- holding that the PSC had the authority to hear a class action involving allegations of violating the “least-cost gas purchasing statute,” although such a power is not specifically enumerated in § 23-3-119, because such a claim would necessarily affect numerous ratepayers, and it was “logical” to conclude that the legislature intended for the Commission to have the authority to hear such actions
- invoking this statute as a basis for denying attorneys' fees to city attorneys for civil litigation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Wendell L. Griffen, Judge, concurring. I would have been happy to reverse the Public Service Commission’s decision on appellant’s second point. However, I am forced to conclude, as Judge Rogers has written in the majority opinion, that the Arkansas General Assembly apparently decided not to confer the power to award attorneys’ fees to the Commission when it enacted Act 758 of 1985. I cannot ignore the plain fact that the General Assembly deleted language in House Bill 393 that would have authorized the Commission to award attorneys’ fees when it enacted Act 758.
Nevertheless, I am convinced that the Commission’s power to regulate public utilities will only be enhanced if the legislature authorizes it to award attorneys’ fees in appropriate cases. The ordinary ratepayer will almost always have too small a pecuniary interest at stake to justify the significant cost of challenging an allegedly excessive utility rate. Yet, such challenges, when successful, produce benefits to a range of ratepayers and serve the public interest in fair utility rates. Unless the legislature confers the power to award attorneys’ fees, it is obvious that potential challenges to allegedly excessive utility rates will go unasserted.