The opinion
Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice, dissenting. This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment holding that Act 155 of 1979 does not violate the proscription against special or local legislation found in Amendment 14 of the Arkansas Constitution.
I dissent from the majority holding that the act in question is special legislation within the meaning of Amendment 14 to the Constitution of Arkansas.
Act 19 of 1965 as Amended is codified as Ark. Stat. Ann. § 22-941 to -948.1 (Supp. 1981). Before being amended this Act provided for the retirement of municipal court judges and clerks in counties having a population of 150,000; judges were allowed to retire after 15 years at age 65 or after 20 years irrespective of age; clerks were allowed to retire after 20 years irrespective of age.
Act 102 of 1969 amended the original Act (Act 19 of 1965) by making its provisions applicable to counties having a population of 150,000 and two or more municipal courts. Although the provision was retained for retirement of judges and clerks after 20 years irrespective of age, the provisions for judges’ retirement at a specific age was lowered from 65 to 50 years and the provision concerning required years of service was raised from 15 to 16 years. Also, clerks were further allowed to retire after ten years of service at age 60.
Act 637 of 1975 further amended Act 19 of 1965 as Amended to allow clerks to retire after eight years of service at age 65.
Act 155 of 1979 further amended the Act as amended to allow clerks to retire after 20 years, irrespective of age, with eight or more of those years served in the office of municipal clerk and with the balance of the required time served as a city employee.
Amendment 14 of the Arkansas Constitution provides that “The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special act.” Although the terms are sometimes used synonymously, “special” relates to persons or things and “local” relates to political or geographic units. Anderson, Special and Local Acts in Arkansas, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 113 (1949); also see Waterman v. Hawkins, 75 Ark. 120 , 86 S.W. 844 (1905).
The Arkansas Supreme Court has consistently held that acts which relate to the administration of justice are neither “special” nor “local.” Waterman, supra; Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827 , 569 S.W. 2d 91 (1978). However, in Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511 , 593 S.W. 2d 11 (1980) this Court did carve out a limited exception to this rule in holding Act 629 of 1979 unconstitutional where the terms of the Act applied to one circuit judge out of five in the Sixth Judicial Circuit; the language indicated that the decision would be otherwise “if it were held to be an Act relating generally to all circuit courts [judges] in the Sixth Judicial Circuit. ...”
This Court has specifically held that acts creating municipal courts constitute general legislation since these courts are a part of the judicial system. See Moose v. Woodruff, 120 Ark. 406 , 179 S.W. 813 (1915) where it was held that an act establishing municipal courts in Little Rock and North Little Rock was not unconstitutional under Amendment 14. Furthermore, Waterman held:
Statutes establishing or abolishing separate courts relate to the administration of justice, and are not either local or special in their operation. Though such an act relates to a court exercising jurisdction over limited territory, it is general in its operation, and affects all citizens coming within the jurisdiction of the court.
Finally, this Court held in Buzbee v. Hutton, 186 Ark. 134 , 52 S.W. 2d 647 (1932) that a clerk is vital to the operation of a court, and, in upholding the constitutionality of a legislative act providing for the appointment rather than the election of the Pulaski County Chancery Court Clerk, stated:
The majority of the court is also of the opinion that the act is not local or special because it is general in its terms, and is not based upon an unreasonable or arbitrary classification. The act affects every one alike coming within its general terms, and is not to be nullified merely because under present conditions only the county of the seat of the State government happens to fall within the general classification.
In this case the majority holds that Act 155 violates Amendment 14 because it is special legislation. In doing so they acknowledge that every act of the legislature carries a strong presumption of constitutionality, and that there must be a clear incompatibility between the act and the constitution before it is held unconstitutional. Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225 , 500 S.W. 2d 368 (1973); Jones v. Mears, 256 Ark. 825 , 510 S.W. 2d 857 (1974). This presumption of constitutionality fully applies when a statute is attacked as local or special, and, where it is doubtful whether the act violates the constitution the doubt must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. State v. Lee, 193 Ark. 270 , 99 S.W. 2d 835 (1936); Whittaker v. Carter, 238 Ark. 1074 , 386 S.W. 2d 498 (1965).
Although it is stipulated in the record that employees from at least three other municipal courts in the county were affected by the Act, the majority boldly assert that Act 155 “was apparently intended to separate the Appellee from other municipal court clerks in Pulaski County.” To substantiate this finding the majority can only point to the appellee’s statement in her letter of retirement referring to the act in question as “my bill.” It is incomprehensible for the majority to rely upon this statement to derive the purpose and intent of the legislature, and to do so is illogical and judicially irresponsible. How can this Court indulge such an assumption when it is acknowledged that the Act applies to Pulaski County and all of its five municipal courts? If there is one speck of evidence in the record or elsewhere to support the majority’s invention of legislative intent, I call upon them to set out this evidence in their opinion.
This legislation is based upon a valid classification, related to the administration of justice, and affects equally all persons who come within its range. The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.