explaining lay opinion testimony may be admitted under N.J.R.E. 701 "only . . . if it falls within the narrow bounds of testimony that is based on the perception of the witness and . . . assist[s] the jury in performing its function"
How later courts described this case
- explaining lay opinion testimony may be admitted under N.J.R.E. 701 "only . . . if it falls within the narrow bounds of testimony that is based on the perception of the witness and . . . assist[s] the jury in performing its function"
- explaining that an officer's lay opinion about whether a neighborhood is a "high crime area" is "firmly rooted in the personal observations and perceptions of the lay witness in the traditional meaning of [N.J.R.E.] 701"
- reversing the defendant's drug distribution conviction when the arresting officer testified that he believed he had witnessed a hand-to-hand narcotics transaction, because such testimony improperly expressed an opinion on the defendant's guilt and did not concern a matter beyond the common understanding of the jurors
- remanding for a new trial on the defendant's possession with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances charge because a police officer, who observed A-3528-16T3 28 the defendant hand an item to an individual in exchange for money, testified as to his opinion that a drug transaction had occurred
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Concluding that testimony proffered by a police officer describing a drug transaction he witnessed constituted opinion testimony did “not meet the requirements needed to qualify it as a lay opinion, and because ... permitting the officer to testify about his *464 opinion invaded the fact-finding province of the jury,” ante at 443, 16 A 3d at 335, the majority reverses that part of the judgment of the Appellate Division that affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence for the third-degree possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, in violation of N.J.S.A 2C:S5—5(a)(1), and the third-degree possession of heroin with the intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property, in violation of N.J.S.A 2C:35-7. Ante at 463, 16 A.3d at 347. 1 To the extent the majority reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division, I must respectfully dissent: the reasoning employed by the Appellate Division in ruling that the challenged testimony was admissible as a proper lay opinion is unassailable.
In point/counter-point fashion, the Appellate Division set forth the position of the parties plainly and concisely:
Defendant asserts initially that because the State did not qualify Altmann as an expert, he should not have been permitted to testify as to his opinion that he had witnessed two drug transactions. The State counters by asserting that Altmann’s testimony was properly elicited as a permissible lay opinion pursuant to N.J.R.K 701, which did not require qualification of the witness as an expert. Defendant maintains that because neither suspected purchaser was ever located, and there was no evidence other than the officer’s word, Altmann’s opinion cannot be considered a lay opinion, as he had no actual knowledge that a drug transaction took place.
After citing to the lay opinion evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 701, the panel noted that “Altmann’s testimony concerning both transactions was based upon his observations, which were a rational basis for his conclusion that drug transactions had occurred.” (citation omitted). It reasoned that, “[cjontrary to defendant’s contention, Altmann did not offer any testimony regarding defendant’s guilt.” It explained that Altmann was “not testifying as an expert; rather, he was testifying as a fact witness reporting his perceptions of defendant’s conduct while he was being surveilled.” Its rationale was straightforward: “Because of his specialized knowl *465 edge and depth of experience as a police officer, [Altmann] was entitled to characterize his perceptions in that manner.” Invoking this Court’s own precedent, it observed that “an expert is not necessary to explain transactions such as the ones observed here, in which ‘each defendant was observed directly handing something to the alleged purchaser and receiving what appeared to be payment in return.’ ” (quoting State v. Nesbitt, 185 N.J. 504, 516 , 888 A.2d 472 (2006)). It therefore declared itself “satisfied that Altmann’s testimony concerning his belief about the occurrences he had perceived was properly admitted as a lay opinion and did not amount to error. It did not usurp the jury’s function to determine guilt.”
In the context of this garden-variety drug prosecution, there is nothing remarkable in the Appellate Division’s reasoning and resulting conclusion. Therefore, to the extent the majority reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment and, in doing so, departs from the commonsense and now well-established notions that infuse the Appellate Division’s affirmance of defendant’s convictions for the possession of heroin with the intent to distribute and for that same possession with intent to distribute within a school zone, I respectfully dissent.
For affirmance in part; reversal in part; remandment—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, HOENS, and Judge STERN (temporarily assigned)—6.
For concurrence in part; dissent in part—Justice RIVERA-SOTO—1.
The majority, however, affirms defendant's convictions and sentence for the third-degree possession of cocaine, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(l), and the third-degree possession of heroin, also in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(l). Ante at 463, 16 A.3d at 347. I concur with those conclusions.