The opinion
LEVY, J.,
with whom SAUFLEY, C.J., and GORMAN, J., join, concurring.
[¶ 27] I concur in the majority opinion and its conclusion that the hearing officer correctly ruled that the insurer’s violation of the “fourteen-day rule,” Me. W.C.B. Rule, ch. 1, § 1, requires it to pay total benefits to the employee from the date of incapacity alleged in the employee’s petition. I am moved to write separately, however, because of the hearing officer’s findings that not only had the insurer acted “diligently” and in “good faith” in seeking to contest the petition and preserve its rights, but also that Doucette had suffered no incapacity.
[¶ 28] Viewed through the lens of these findings, the penalty imposed in this case, in excess of $140,000, appears to be unfair, possibly punitive, and contrary to some of the policy objectives of the Workers’ Compensation Act. It is beyond the authority of this Court, however, to remedy this unfairness. See, Cf. Wentzell v. Timberlands, Inc., 412 A.2d 1213, 1214-15 (Me.1980) (declining to construe a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act in a manner inconsistent with its plain language in order to achieve fairness). Our review of the Board’s decisions is circumscribed by the Act itself. See 39-A M.R.S. §§ 318, 322 (2010), see also Guar. Fund Mgmt. Servs. v. Workers’ Comp. Bd., 678 A.2d 578, 582-83 (Me.1996); Jordan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 651 A.2d 358, 362 (Me.1994). We have already determined that the Board did not exceed its authority in promulgating Board Rule, ch. 1, § 1. Bridgeman v. S.D. Warren Co., 2005 ME 38, ¶¶ 12-15 , 872 A.2d 961, 965 .
[¶ 29] Having promulgated the rule, the Board, as represented by its hearing officer, was not authorized to invoke equitable principles to achieve a more just *109 outcome. See Bird v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 512 A.2d 1035, 1037-38 (Me.1986). Nonetheless, it is hard not to be left with the sense that the end result in this case is not just. The only apparent path that might lead to greater justice, at least for purposes of future cases, is for the Board to examine the circumstances and outcome in this case to determine whether further development of the fourteen-day rule is needed.