holding that "[e]xcept for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as 'structural,' no error, whether it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory requirement, is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis"
How later courts described this case
- holding that "[e]xcept for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as 'structural,' no error, whether it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory requirement, is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis"
- holding that ‘‘except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the Supreme Court as ‘structural,’ no error whether it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory requirement, is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis.”
- holding that former Rule 81(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires harm analysis for all trial errors except those held “structural” by Supreme Court
- recognizing that, “where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis, then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BAIRD, Judge,
concurring.
On direct appeal appellant contended the trial judge erred in failing to admonish appellant as required by Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(4). The Court of Appeals, relying on art. 26.13(c), held the trial judge substantially complied because the art. 26.13(a)(4) admonishment was immaterial to appellant’s plea. Cain v. State, 893 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1995). We granted review to determine the correctness of this holding.
I.
Art. 26.13(a)(4) provides that the trial judge shall admonish the defendant of:
the fact that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States of America, a plea of guilty or nolo contendré for the offense charged may result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country, or the denial of naturalization under federal law.
Under the mandatory language of the statute, the admonishment must be given to every defendant entering a plea of guilty. Morales v. State, 872 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Tex. Cr.App.1994) (Clinton, Overstreet, Maloney and MEYERS, JJ., concurring) (citing Ex parte Cervantes, 762 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.Cr. App.1988)).
In Morales , the defendant entered into a plea bargain whereby she agreed to plead guilty to one offense and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining indictment. In admonishing Morales of the consequences of her guilty plea, the trial judge failed to admonish under art. 26.13(a)(4). Because the record did not establish Morales’ citizenship, the Court of Appeals reversed, 838 S.W.2d 272, 276 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1992), and we affirmed. 872 S.W.2d 753 . Both opinions were reached through the standard method of statutory interpretation, i.e., relying on the literal text of the statute. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).
II..
Art. 26.13(c) provides that substantial compliance is sufficient unless the defendant shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was mislead or harmed by the admonishment of the court. 1 In the instant case, the Court of Appeals held subsection (c) applied when the record affirmatively proves the defendant is a United States citizen. Cain, 893 S.W.2d at 681 . This holding conflicts with Morales in which we held there can not be substantial compliance where there is no. compliance. This holding was dictated by precedent. See, Ex parte McAtee, 599 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Tex. Cr.App.1980); Ex parte Cervantes, 762 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex.CrApp.1988); and, Hughes v. State, 833 S.W.2d 137, 140 . 2 To find substantial compliance in cases where there had been a total failure to admonish would stand Boykin on its head. Therefore, I would hold the Court of Appeals erred in finding substantial compliance when the trial judge wholly failed to admonish appellant under subsection (a)(4). However, this conclusion does not necessarily mean appellant is entitled to relief.
III.
This Court recognizes an exception to Boy-kin ’s literal text method of statutory interpretation. The exception applies when the statute’s plain language would lead to an absurd result which the Legislature could not possibly have intended. Id. This exception comes into play in the instant ease because here, unlike Morales where the record as to citizenship was silent, the record shows that *266 appellant was born in Texas. Cain, 893 S.W.2d at 685 . Appellant is, therefore, a non-deportable citizen of the United States. Under these circumstances, an interpretation requiring reversal of a conviction because the defendant did not receive an admonishment that was totally inapplicable to him and could not have affected his plea of guilty would lead to an absurd result. 3 Consequently, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that appellant was not entitled to relief was correct, albeit for a different reason.
IY.
Our holdings in Cervantes, Morales and the instant case may be harmonized as follows: when a trial judge fails to admonish a defendant pursuant to art. 26.13(a)(4) reversal is required if the defendant is not a United States citizen, Cervantes; or, if the defendant’s citizenship is unknown, Morales ; but, an affirmance is in order if the record affirmatively establishes the defendant is a United States citizen. Another construction of art. 26.13 would either reject the literal text of the statute or lead to an absurd result. Moreover, under this construction, there is no need to overrule established precedent.
With these comments, I join only the judgment of the Court.
PRICE, J., joins this opinion.
. Art. 26.13(c) provides:
In admonishing the defendant as herein provided, substantial compliance by the court is sufficient unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court.
. The holding rule announced in Morales has been reaffirmed by this Court in Ex parte Tovar, 901 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995), and Ex parte Akhtab, 901 S.W.2d 488, 489, n. 3 (Tex.Cr. App.1995).
. In Morales , the concurrence stated:
Clearly, American citizens are not subject to deportation as a result of criminal conviction and cannot, therefore, be influenced by the possibility of immigration difficulties when deciding whether to plead guilty to a criminal offense.
Id., 872 S.W.2d at 755 ( Clinton, Overstreet, Maloney and MEYERS, JJ., concurring).