recognizing that “allow[ing] plaintiffs to characterize premises defect claims as claims caused by the negligent condition or use of personal or real property would render the Legislature’s heightened requirements for premises defect claims meaningless” (citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “allow[ing] plaintiffs to characterize premises defect claims as claims caused by the negligent condition or use of personal or real property would render the Legislature’s heightened requirements for premises defect claims meaningless” (citations omitted)
- rejecting the argument that the Tort Claims Act "creates two entirely separate grounds of liability" for negligent use or condition of real property and premise defect, but instead interpreting the premises defect provision to further limit the waiver of immunity for negligent use or condition of real property
- rejecting the argument that the Tort Claims Act Acreates two entirely separate grounds of liability@ for negligent use or condition of real property and premise defect, but instead interpreting the premises defect provision to further limit the waiver of immunity for negligent use or condition of real property
- rejecting the argument that the TTCA “creates two entirely separate grounds of liability” for negligent use or condition of real property and a premises defect, but instead interpreting the premises defect provision to further limit the waiver of immunity for negligent use or condition of real property
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
REAVLEY, Justice
(concurring).
For a rule of liability of the possessor of land to a licensee, I prefer that of Section 342 of the Restatement of Torts. Both the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals have applied that rule in reaching their judgments for this plaintiff. Under that rule, the possessor of land has no duty to inspect the land; but if he knows of facts which would put a reasonable person on notice of the defect and unreasonable risk of harm, he is charged with knowledge of the danger. It is an objective test of the defendant’s knowledge of the danger based upon facts within his actual knowledge. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12(1) (1965). I am prepared to extend the duty of owner-occupiers of land in Texas accordingly.
I cannot, however, vote for recovery by this plaintiff. This is a premises defect and Section 18(b) of the Texas Tort Claims Act controls, as this Court holds. The Act would not make the State liable and suable for the janitor’s misapplication of wax. Furthermore, I would not ascribe to the Legislature an intention to give to this Court the power to modify the duty owed to a licensee and expand the State’s liability unless the Texas Tort Claims Act gave some indication of that intention.
SAM D. JOHNSON, J., joins in this concurring opinion.