holding that defendant was not entitled to impeach State’s witness during cross-examination with evidence of pending federal charges against witness when testimony supporting defendant’s offer of proof did “no more than establish the factual basis of the pending federal charges”
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant was not entitled to impeach State’s witness during cross-examination with evidence of pending federal charges against witness when testimony supporting defendant’s offer of proof did “no more than establish the factual basis of the pending federal charges”
- concluding that the trial court did not. err in refusing to allow the defense to cross-examine a witness about pending charges when the defense failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the witness's pending federal charges and his testimony in his state case
- stating that “[e]xposing a witnesses] motivation to testify for or against the accused or the State is a proper and important purpose of cross-examination”
- “Exposing a witness’s motivation to testify for or against the accused or the State is a proper and important purpose of cross-examination.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Irby, Christopher (2010)
In light of the above, it is clear to see that Carpenter was distinguishable from Maxwell for
The opinion
MANSFIELD, Judge,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. It is my opinion that appellant’s right to cross-examine a State’s "witness concerning pending charges against the witness is implicated only where the pending charges have been brought by the same prosecutorial authority (or, perhaps, another nonfederal prosecutorial authority in Texas) which is prosecuting appellant. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (Meyers, J., concurring, at 501). Cross-examination of the State’s witness concerning the pending federal charges would possibly also be within appellant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment where there was evidence that the State’s witness would derive a benefit from the State concerning any pending State charges by testifying against appellant or where there was evidence the State agreed to tell the federal authorities the witness had *636 been of assistance to the State. 1 See also, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 321 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 (Stewart, J., concurring). The mere possibility the witness may derive a benefit under federal sentencing guidelines by testifying in a State prosecution on the State’s behalf does not implicate the Confrontation Clause, based on any reasonable interpretation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis v. Alaska.
I join the opinion of the Court.
. The pending federal charges against the witness were ultimately dropped. In any event, at most, they could have been used only to show bias or motive and could not have been used to impeach the witness’ credibility as there was no final conviction. See Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 609.