stating that “if the jury is given a partial or substantively correct charge on reasonable doubt, then any error therein is subject to harm analysis under Abdnor, Almanza, and [Article 36.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure]”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “if the jury is given a partial or substantively correct charge on reasonable doubt, then any error therein is subject to harm analysis under Abdnor, Almanza, and [Article 36.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure]”
- noting placement of burden on defendant to show harm as difference between harm analysis under Almanza and that applicable to other errors
- total failure to give instruction as to reasonable doubt is fundamental error analyzed under federal harmless error rule; however, if partial or substantially correct charge is given, any error therein is subject to Almanza rule
- “If there is a total omission of the instruction on reasonable doubt, such error defies meaningful analysis by harmless-error standards.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MANSFIELD, Judge,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. However, I am concerned that an elimination of the requirement that the jury be given the reasonable doubt instruction mandated by Geesa might breathe new life into the so-called reasonable hypothesis analytical construct eliminated by Geesa, and rendered largely meaningless by implication by Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).