discussing the importance of assessing the reliability of scientific evidence and how trial judges must act as gatekeepers to weed out "junk” science; concluding that the scientific testimony of a psychologist on the reliability of eyewitness identification is relevant and may be admissible
How later courts described this case
- discussing the importance of assessing the reliability of scientific evidence and how trial judges must act as gatekeepers to weed out "junk” science; concluding that the scientific testimony of a psychologist on the reliability of eyewitness identification is relevant and may be admissible
- holding that failure of expert on eyewitness identification to take into account certain facts is matter of weight and credibility, not admissibility
- noting that expert testimony must be sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute; “Expert testimony that does not relate to a fact in issue is not helpful.”
- noting that the facts upon which an expert testimony is based do not need to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that the expert may assume the truth of the facts in order to give her testimony
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*557 KELLER, Judge,
dissenting.
If I understand the majority correctly, a trial judge faced with a decision as to whether to admit expert testimony should determine three matters: (1) whether the evidence is reliable, (2) whether it is relevant, and (8) whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value.
Reliability is to be determined by reference to factors enumerated in Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), as set out in the majority opinion in footnotes 5 and 6. The question of reliability is the “Is it science?” question.
Relevance is established by determining whether the expert testimony relates to a fact in issue. The question of relevance is the “Does it fit?” question.
Probative value versus prejudicial value is determined via the traditional R. 403 analysis, as footnote 4 of the majority opinion explains.
I agree that a trial court should exclude proffered expert testimony if it does not meet any one of the three tests outlined by the majority. 1 I disagree with the majority in its application of the principles announced today to the facts of this case.
The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court was within its discretion in excluding the evidence because:
The failure of the expert to conduct a thorough, fact specific analysis of the eyewitness identifications adversely affected the value of the testimony to the jury, and the trial court could properly have found that cross-examination of the witnesses provided the jury with the same information without creating unnecessary confusion.
Jordan v. State, 877 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex.App. — Ft. Worth 1994). According to the majority, this holding of the Court of Appeals “... was based upon its conclusion that the evidence did not sufficiently ‘fit’ the facts of the case.” Op. at 555.
This is where I disagree. I interpret the above language as a determination that the trial court could have excluded the testimony under a R. 408 balancing test. The words “adversely affected the value” and “without creating unnecessary confusion” suggest this conclusion to me most forcefully.
If the Court of Appeals held that the evidence was properly excludable because it was irrelevant (did not “fit”), then the majority is probably correct. But I do not believe that that court ever adopted or meant to adopt the strict notion of “fit” attributed to them by the majority. Op. at 556.
If, on the other hand, the Court of Appeals meant merely that the lack of a perfect “fit” adversely affected probative value in a R. 403 analysis, then the Court of Appeals was right. I think that is exactly what the Court of Appeals said. And I agree with the Court of Appeals that, under a R. 403 analysis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony. 2 I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I respectfully dissent to remanding the cause to the Court of Appeals.
MeCORMICK, P. J., joins.
. In addition to the three matters cited by the majority, expert testimony must also satisfy a helpfulness requirement under R. 702. Expert testimony does not "assist” the trier of fact if the jury is just as capable as the expert in drawing conclusions about the subject matter in question. See Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706, 710 (Tex.Crim.App.1993)(expert testimony concerning truthfulness).
. I note that a trial judge may determine that evidence is admissible strictly on the basis of R. 702, and that, unless a R. 403 objection is made at trial by the parly opposing admission, he may not complain on appeal on that basis about the admission of the evidence. On the other hand, regardless of whether a R. 403 objection was made at trial, an appellate court may find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence by finding that the evidence could have been excluded on R. 403 grounds. Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838, 843 (Tex.Crim. App.1995), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 131 , 133 L.Ed.2d 80 (1995)(a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence may be sustained on any theory of law applicable to the case, including R. 403).