stating that "[a]n illegal exaction is an act that is not authorized or which is contrary to law." Id. at 505
How later courts described this case
- stating that "[a]n illegal exaction is an act that is not authorized or which is contrary to law." Id. at 505
- alleging that public funds were impermissibly being spent on a bond issued for a different purpose
- upholding illegal exaction challenges where there has been a failure of purpose, notwithstanding the legality of the initial tax levy
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING
Robert H. Dudley, Justice. We deny the petition for rehearing, but write to supplement the original opinion on one issue.
The original opinion states that we do not consider a statute passed during the pendency of an appeal. That statement is in error. In fact, we have recently considered two (2) acts passed after the trial court ruled. Treiber v. Hess, 301 Ark. 97 , 782 S.W.2d 43 (1990); Nathaniel v. Forrest City School Dist. No. 7, 300 Ark. 513 , 780 S.W.2d 539 (1989). We have long done so. Van Hook v. McNeil Monument Co., 107 Ark. 292 , 155 S.W. 110 (1913). However, “the legislature cannot, by enactment of a retrospective statute, exercise a power in its nature clearly judicial.” Federal Express Corp. v. Skelton, 265 Ark. 187, 196 , 578 S.W.2d 1 (1979). It is prohibited from doing so by the separation of powers doctrine. Federal Express Corp. v. Skelton, supra. Thus, even if we construed the act in this case to be retroactive, we would not allow it to retroactively annul a court decision.
Rehearing denied.