finding that appellant’s actions were consistent with an |i:iimplied agreement between the parties that depositions would not be used as evidence at trial; thus, appellant had waived the literal wording of Ark. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)
How later courts described this case
- finding that appellant’s actions were consistent with an |i:iimplied agreement between the parties that depositions would not be used as evidence at trial; thus, appellant had waived the literal wording of Ark. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)
- finding that a case had not been expressly or implicitly overruled because, despite an intervening and apparently contradictory decision, the court thereafter cited the earlier case with approval and followed its holding
- assignments of error that are unsupported by convincing argument or authority will not be considered on appeal unless it is apparent without further research that they are well taken
- distinguishing residence and domicile for purposes of venue statute
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Darrell Hickman, Justice, concurring. I agree with the result but write to say that I doubt we can distinguish the cases of Belford v. Taylor, 241 Ark. 220 , 406 S.W.2d 868 (1966), and Twin City Coach Co. v. Stewart, 209 Ark. 310 , 190 S.W.2d 629 (1945). Both cases effectively interpret the residence requirement for venue to mean “domicile.” That is an incorrect interpretation of the law according to Norton v. Parkins, 203 Ark. 586 , 157 S.W.2d 765 (1942). While Belford was a writ of prohibition case, it was decided on the basis of its facts, relying on the Stewart case. We ought not leave the Stewart and Belford cases in the backwater of the law. We should overrule them expressly, which we are doing by implication in this case.
Glaze, J., joins the concurrence.