explaining that the genesis of the requirement that a defendant be aware of the price of rejecting the bargain in cases involving allegations of prosecutorial vindictiveness
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the genesis of the requirement that a defendant be aware of the price of rejecting the bargain in cases involving allegations of prosecutorial vindictiveness
- "[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is 'patently unconstitutional.'"
- “We conclude the rationale of Pearce does not and cannot apply to the instant case simply because appellant never exercised his statutory or constitutional right to review by a higher court.”
- trial court has no duty to admonish defendant of the consequences of defendant’s rejection of the plea agreement
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*30 OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
W.C. DAVIS, Judge.
On original submission we affirmed appellant’s conviction, holding that appellant’s “withdrawal” from his negotiated plea in the trial court, his subsequent trial and conviction by a jury, and the imposition by the trial judge of a sentence more severe than that originally imposed under the terms of the plea bargain, does not implicate North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). After reconsideration of appellant’s contention, we abide by our original opinion. The motion for rehearing is denied.
TEAGUE, J., dissents.