Opinion

Brown v. Brown

  • 952 S.W.2d 707
  • 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 95
  • 1997 WL 606499
Court
Court of Appeals of Kentucky
Filed
Feb 7, 1997
Status
Published
Author
Emberton
On the bench
Combs, Emberton, Gudgel
Cited by
6 cases

Courts have flexibility to fashion appropriate child support orders for situation not addressed by statutory scheme.

How later courts described this case

  • Courts have flexibility to fashion appropriate child support orders for situation not addressed by statutory scheme.

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

EMBERTON, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

*709 The language of Ky.Rev.Stat. (KRS) 403.212 clearly establishes that parents are equally obligated to pay support for their minor children. Guidelines to be used in calculating the amount each parent is obligated to contribute also are adequately set forth.

Apparently neither party here disputes the amount found to be the total support obligation, $1,919. Based upon the income of each party, the trial court found Mrs. Hays to be responsible for contributing 57.4% of the $1,919 total support, i.e., $1,101.50. It found Mr. Brown to be responsible for contributing 42.6% of the $1,919 total support, i.e., $817.49. However, since the children live with Mrs. Hays 40% of the time and with Mr. Brown 60% of the time the trial court found that a deviation from the guidelines was appropriate. KRS 403.212.

I agree that the trial court is correct in its computation of Mrs. Hays’ obligation as to her portion of the total support amount, and of its modification of that amount to reflect the relative time she and Mr. Brown share in the custody of the children. However, I believe it to be an abuse of discretion in failing to require Mr. Brown to make his modified contribution to Mrs. Hays.

Mr. Brown has custody 60% of the time, therefore, he should receive from Mrs. Hays 60% of her $1,101.49 obligation, i.e., $660.90.

Mrs. Hays has custody 40% of the time, therefore, she should received from Mr. Brown 40% of his $817.49 obligation, i.e., $327.

Obviously, the order should simply provide that Mrs. Hays pay to Mr. Brown the difference in the respective amounts, i.e., $333.90.

I would reverse and remand with instructions to calculate consistent with this dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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