Glover v. Henry

Jim Johnson, Associate Justice, dissenting. This case involves two separate and distinct points of law. The first point was obviously raised to divert attention from the second point which is the gravaman of this lawsuit. Certainty I agree with the majority opinion relative to point one.

Point two urged by appellant for reversal is as follows :

“The lower court erred in holding that persons appointed to serve on the school boards, to fill vacancies created as the result of recall, pursuant to Act 9 of 1958, Acts of Arkansas, were appointed to serve only until the next annual school election, at which time the unexpired terms of the recalled members would be filled.”

The trial court adopted the view that under Act 9 a person appointed to succeed a recalled school board member serves only until the next regular annual school election, thereby sustaining the demurrer filed by appellees. I am convinced that the demurrer should have been sustained but not for the reasons given by the Chancellor. We have said many times that we would not disturb a decree in Chancery if the results reached, even though based on incorrect reasons, corresponded with the result reached by us on trial de novo. Martin v. Taylor, 188 Ark. 114 , 65 S. W. 2d 4 . The Chancellor based his ruling on § 8 and an exception contained in § 9 of Act 9 of the 1958 Special Session of the Legislature. This dissent is based not on the terms of the Act but upon the crystal clear language of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas.

It is true that the constitutionality of Act 9 was not raised in the trial court nor was it argued in the briefs. In fact, appellees came very near confessing judgment in this case. The last time we were called upon to render a decision in a case involving a matter of such public interest, wherein it was obvious from the briefs that all parties to the lawsuit wanted the same result, we invited all attorneys in Arkansas, who were interested in the question involved, to file briefs amici curiae. See: Andres v. First Arkansas Development Corp........... Ark.........., 324 S. W. 2d 97 . This same procedure should have been followed in this case. I am confident that had such procedure been followed, it would have been helpful in preventing the majority from interpreting the constitution according to their notion of what the constitution ought to say rather than what its language clearly provides.

I am acutely aware of the long standing rule that this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless necessary for disposition of the pending cause. Dept, of Public Utilities v. Ark. La. Gas Go., 194 Ark. 354 , 108 S. W. 2d 586 . Certainly it is necessary to the disposition of this cause to rule on the constitutionality of Act 9 since § 8 of the Act is diametrically opposed to § 1 of Amendment 29 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas.

Section 8 of Act 9 is as follows:

“ Vacancies occurring under the provisions of this act shall be filled by the County Board of Education. Not more than one election for recall shall be held under the provisions hereof in any one school year. Persons appointed to fill the vacancies hereunder may also be recalled under the provisions of this act.”

Section 1 of Amendment 29 is as follows:

“Vacancies in the office of United States Senator, and in all elective state, district, circuit, county, and township offices except those of Lieutenant Governor, Member of the General Assembly and Representative in the Congress of the United States, shall be filled by appointment by the Governor.” (Emphasis supplied).

It is obvious that these two sections cannot be reconciled. This being true, then the Constitution must prevail. The majority opinion contends that § 1 of Amendment 29 does not apply to school districts. My research reveals that Amendment 29 was initiated by the people and approved at the General Election November 8, 1938; that there was in existence at the time of the adoption of this Amendment an Act of the Legislature, Act 30 of 1935, which provided a method for filling all vacancies occurring on school boards contrary to Amendment 29; that the boards have consistently followed Act 30 since the adoption of this Amendment and that the method of selection has remained unchanged until the adoption of § 8 of Act 9 of 1958; that this Court has never had occasion to pass on the constitutionality of either of these acts until the appeal of the case at bar. Does the fact that school boards have ignored Amendment 29 exempt them from its application? My research fails to reveal one single precedent where this Court has held that an Act of the Legislature, which is clearly contrary to a constitutional provision, should be held valid simply because certain persons failed or refused to follow the law. It is unthinkable that the majority should now at this late date so hold.

What is a district? Webster defines the word “district” as a defined portion of the state. Can the majority say that a school district is not a defined portion pf the State? C. J. S. Vol. 27, page 617 defines “district” as follows: “In its ordinary meaning the word is commonly and properly used to designate any one of the various divisions or subdivisions into which the State is divided for political or other purposes, and may refer either to a congressional, judicial, senatorial, representative, school, or road district, depending always on the connection in which it is used . . .” (Emphasis supplied). Can the majority say that a school district is not a political subdivision of the state which enjoys the privileges and immunities as such? Every other Supreme Court in the United States that has ruled on this question, that I have been able to find, says that a school district is a political subdivision of the State. See: Vol. 26, Sec. II B, Key 21, page 1340, Sixth Decennial Digest. The Supreme Court of New York in Nassau County v. Lincer, 165 Misc. 909 , 3 N.Y. S. 2d 327, page 334, said that: ‘ ‘ School districts are, like counties, governmental subdivisions of the state, though their governmental function is confined to education.” The Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Special Tax School District No. 5 of Dade County, 144 So. 356 , held that where a constitutional amendment authoxúzed issuance of refunding bonds by counties, municipalities, and districts, the word “district” included school districts. The Supreme Court of Nebraska in State ex rel Gordon v. Moores et al., 96 N. W. 1011 , in interpreting the following language in their constitution, “all state, district, county, precinct, and township officers, by the Constitution or laws made elective by the people, except school district officers, and municipal officers in cities, villages and towns, shall be elected at a general election to be held as aforesaid,” had this to say: “It would seem that the word ‘district’ as used in the Constitution in reference to general elections, must refer as well to districts created by the Legislature as those provided for in the Constitution, because it excepts specially ‘school district officers,’ thus mentioning a district that must be created by the Legislature, but which would be included in the requirement unless so specially excepted.” (Emphasis supplied).

Unlike the Nebraska Constitution, our Constitution does not except school districts. There are, however, other exceptions in the amendment and it is reasonable to believe that if the people had meant to make further exceptions they would have done so. The majority opinion, in effect, says that because of the sequence in which the word “district” appears in the amendment that its meaning changes according to the position it holds in the same sentence.

I have been unable to find one single opinion in the history of recorded cases from any jurisdiction so holding, nor was the majority able to supply one. All of the decisions are to the contrary. See: State ex rel Gordon v. Moores et al, supra. It is a well settled rule of construction that where words or a group of words have received a judicial interpretation, it is presumed that they are used in the light of the interpretation placed upon them. Glover v. Hot Springs Kennel Club, 230 Ark.........., 323 S. W. 2d 902 .

The majority says that a school district office is not a part of the constitutional scheme. Obviously they must have overlooked Amendment 40 to the Constitution, and as to school districts Art. 14, § 3, and Amendment 11. In fact, the office is so much a part of thé constitutional scheme that the framers of the Constitution found it necessary to add a special constitutional provision, Art. 19, § 26, allowing them to hold executive or judicial offices at the same time they were holding a public school office. To the majority, the office of school director may be merely a subordinate administrative position, but to me they hold one of the most important positions in government. Not only do we place under their supervision our most treasured possession (our children) but we entrust them with the expenditure of more public money than is expended by any other political subdivision of the State. I will admit that school districts are created by statute] however, it must be admitted by the majority that the districts of the two offices they contend Amendment 29 applies to are also created by statute.

Let’s assume that the Legislature had made the office of Commissioner of Education an elective state office, the same to be filled at the following school election. John Doe was elected. Two months after assuming office he dies. Would the majority say that the vacancy could not be filled by the Governor under Amendment 29? The amendment says: “all elective state, district, circuit, county, and township offices . . .” Not all elective state, district, circuit, county, and township offices created by the Constitution. Since prosecuting attorneys and chancellors are paid by the State and participate in the State Retirement Act, it seems to me much more logical to say that the offices of prosecuting attorney and chancellor are state offices and not district offices than it is to say that a school director is not a district office.

It is true that § 4 of Amendment 29 contemplates that the successors to the Governor’s appointees will be elected at the general election and will take office on the following January first. Point one of the present opinion with which I agree affirms the date of the annual school election to be on the first Tuesday in December. Section 80-505, which was Act 30 of 1935, provides:

“Each school director elected or appointed shall, within ten (10) days after receiving notice of his election or appointment subscribe to the following oath * # *

‘ ‘ The County Clerk upon receipt of oath prescribed for school director, shall immediately commission such persons and they shall enter at once upon their duties as school directors.”

Prom the date of the election, the time required for the certification of the votes, the sending and receiving of the notice of election, the preparation and filing of the oath, and the preparation and delivery of the commission, could easily consume a great part of one month. If it should not, the greatest span of time possible between the election and assuming office under the above statute would be less than 30 days. The majority is grabbing at straws when it cites this as an excuse for not yielding to the clear terms of the Constitution; particularly is this true since the variance in the time of assuming office would only occur in cases of elections following the filling of vacancies by appointment. The same variance of time, for example, would occur in an election following the appointment of a Secretary of State, State Auditor, State Treasurer, or Attorney General, since neither of them assume office on January 1st. Certainly the Constitution must prevail.

The majority says that “The Constitution has always provided that elective state, district, circuit, county, and township officers be elected at the general election and cites Schedule, § 3, Art. 3, § 8, as authority for such statement. Schedule, § 3, says absolutely nothing about general elections and Art. 3, § 8, simply gives the Legislature the authority to fix the time of general elections. The Legislature has exercised this authority many times. It has set some general elections on odd number of years. See: Laster v. Pruniski, 228 Ark. 132 , 306 S. W. 2d 123 ; some on even number of years. See § 3-802, Ark. Stats.; and some, such as school elections, every year. A general election is one that regularly recurs in each election precinct of the state on a day designated by law. Bethune v. Funk, 166 P. 931 , 85 Ore. 246 . Since school elections under Ark. Stats, regularly recur in each election precinct of this state on a day designated by law, the annual school election is a general election.

I agree with the majority when they say that “in construing a constitutional amendment it is helpful to determine what changes the amendment was intended to make in the existing law. Bradley v. Hall, 220 Ark. 925 , 251 S. W. 2d 470 .” However, I sharply disagree with them when they say, in effect, that no changes were made; that Amendment 29 was passed simply to reaffirm powers that the Governor already possessed in order that other powers he possessed might be changed a bit. If the majority view is correct in this matter, then there was no need for the greater portion of Amendment 29. Having personally sponsored two proposed constitutional amendments by initiative petitions, as Amendment 29 was sponsored, I find it hard to believe that the people who circulated the petitions to get it on the ballot were working just for the exercise. From what I have said above, the only rational conclusion that I can reach is that a school board member under Arkansas law is an elected district officer within the clear terms of § 1 of Amendment 29.

Act 9 has a separability clause, construing it liberally as we must in favor of effectuating its purpose. It is our duty to strike the invalid portions of the Act and allow the other portions to stand. Cotham v. Coffman, 111 Ark. 108 , 163 S. W. 1183 . Therefore, I would hold that Section 8 of Act 9 of 1958 is unconstitutional and must fall in its entirety; that the exception in § 9 relative to Act 30, Ark. Acts of 1935, must fall because of its unconstitutionality. Following this action I would declare that the remaining portions of Act 9 of 1958 are valid and constitutional. The balance of this Act would be far from meaningless since § 4 of Amendment 29 would supply the machinery to make the application of the remaining portions of the Act complete and whole.

Section 4 of Amendment 29 is as follows:

“The appointee shall serve during the entire unexpired term in the office in which the vacancy occurs if such office would in regular course be filled at the next General Election if no vacancy had occurred. If such office would not in regular course be filled at such next general election the vacancy shall be filled as follows: At the next General Election, if the vacancy occurs four months or more prior thereto, and at the second General Election after the vacancy occurs if the vacancy occurs less than four months before the next General Election after it occurs. The person so elected shall take office on the 1st day of January following his election.”

In construing § 4 of Amendment 29 relative to the case at bar, I would declare that the 1st Tuesday in December is the date of the next General School Election. See: Laster v. Pruniski, supra.

I would further declare that the present appointees serving on the Little Bock School Board are de facto officers serving only until replaced by valid appointees of the Governor; that since the span of time between such gubernatorial appointment and the next General School Election would be less than four months, such appointees, except the one filling the position the term of which expires this year, would serve until the second General School Election following their appointment.

In addition to the fact that I am convinced that appellant is not a proper party in interest to bring this action under our declaratory judgment statutes, 1 2which point also was not argued by appellee, I respectfully dissent.

See Micklish v. Grand Lodge of the Loyal Star, 162 Ark. 71 , 87 A.L.R. 1243 .