holding that a veniremember who "refuses to render a guilty verdict on the basis of only one eyewitness is not challengeable for cause on that account so long as his refusal is predicated on his reasonable understanding of what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt"
How later courts described this case
- holding that a veniremember who "refuses to render a guilty verdict on the basis of only one eyewitness is not challengeable for cause on that account so long as his refusal is predicated on his reasonable understanding of what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt"
- holding that one preserves 2 his complaint about being unable to ask questions during voir dire by presenting the specific question to the trial court and obtaining an adverse ruling
- holding that one preserves his complaint about being unable to ask questions during voir dire by presenting the specific question to the trial court and obtaining an adverse ruling
- holding juror challengeable for cause because juror would not convict on basis of single witness’s testimony even if testimony was sufficient to convince juror of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BAIRD, Judge,
concurring on appellant’s petition for discretionary review.
While I agree the Court of Appeals erred in holding Garrett was not applicable at the guilVinnocenee phase of a trial, I do not believe Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), and Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), are irreconcilable.
In Caldwell , the veniremember stated he could not convict based upon the testimony of a single witness, even if that testimony convinced him of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 Id., 818 S.W.2d at 796-797 . We held the veniremember was subject to a challenge for cause because “he would have held the State to a higher burden of proof than that required by law.” Id., 818 S.W.2d at 797 .
In Garrett , the State challenged for cause a veniremember who would not affirmatively answer the “future dangerousness” capital punishment issue based solely on the facts of the capital offense. Id., 851 S.W.2d at 857-859 . The trial judge granted the challenge believing the veniremember had a bias or prejudice against the law upon which the State was entitled to rely. Id., 851 S.W.2d at 859 . We reversed, holding “an individual juror must determine what proof beyond a reasonable doubt means to him.” Ibid. Simply because the veniremember may him *537 self have a higher threshold “than the minimum required to sustain a jury verdict does not indicate he has a bias or prejudice against the law.” Id., 851 S.W.2d at 860 .
From the voir dire in the instant case it is clear the veniremember did not believe the testimony of a single narcotic agent would normally be sufficient to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Ante at 531-532. But Garrett guarantees the veniremember the right to his own definition of reasonable doubt. Thus, I agree Garrett controls the resolution of the instant case.
However, it does not necessarily follow that Garrett and Caldwell are in conflict. In Caldwell , the veniremember stated he could never convict upon the testimony of a single witness, even if that testimony convinced the veniremember of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., 818 S.W.2d at 796-797 . In other words, the veniremember would have held the State to a greater burden and therefore was subject to a challenge for cause under Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 35.16(b)(3). But in the instant case, there is no evidence the veniremember would have held the State to a greater burden of proof. On the contrary, the record establishes that if the State convinced the veniremember of appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the venire-member would follow the law and convict. 2
The distinction between these cases is subtle but important: the State is entitled to a jury that -will convict if it believes the State has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. A veniremember who would require more is subject to a challenge for cause. Caldwell, supra. However, the State is not entitled to challenge for cause venire-members whose definition of beyond a rea-
sonable doubt is higher than the legal minimum. Garrett, supra.
With these comments, I join only the judgment 0f the Court.
. The veniremember in Caldwell testified:
PROSECUTOR: You understand what I am talking about, that even if you heard one eyewitness and you believed the witness beyond a reasonable doubt and that eyewitness' testimony proves the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt, you would still require additional evidence before you would return a verdict of guilty?
VENIREMEMBER: Yes.
* ⅝ * * * *
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Would you really not be able to — are you saying that under no circumstance would you be able to base a verdict on the testimony of one witness?
VENIREMEMBER: No.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Would it depend on the quality of the testimony of that one witness and the credibility of that one witness?
VENIREMEMBER: No.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: What are you telling me?
VENIREMEMBER: That I would require more evidence than one witness.
Id., 818 S.W.2d at 796-797 .
. The following occurred during the instant voir dire:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: The scenario that has been painted is that if there was one witness, and that one witness gave testimony, are you saying that no matter how credible, even if you believed him a hundred percent, you would still not be able to fairly decide this case based on just one person’s testimony?
VENIREMEMBER: No. If he convinced me, if he convinced me, and there were other corroborative testimony....
... and there was other evidence that it was crack that was taken into, you know, as evidence, yeah, yeah, I would find your man guilty.
* * * * * *
THE COURT: That is with one witness?
VENIREMEMBER: With one witness right....