concluding that the regulation of attorney conduct is in at least some respects a shared power of the judicial and legislative branches
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the regulation of attorney conduct is in at least some respects a shared power of the judicial and legislative branches
- determining that CUTPA's regulation of "the conduct of any trade or commerce does not totally exclude all conduct of the profession of law"
- "[W]e need only conclude that CUTPA's regulation ... does not totally exclude all conduct of the profession of law."
- “[This] case [involves] a facial attack [premised on the separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution] on the constitutionality of a statute which has a sphere of operation that need never intrude upon the exclusive province of the judiciary to control the conduct of attorneys as officers of the court. We cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that, at some time in the future, *854 a more difficult confrontation will have to be resolved. Judicial restraint counsels us to await that event.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Parskey, J.
(concurring). I agree that the legal profession may, under certain circumstances, be subject to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act; General Statutes §§ 42-110a through 42-110q; and that in these circumstances the act is constitutional. I also agree that the defendant by its activity was engaged in a trade or commerce within the meaning of § 42-110a (4) and that therefore it was subject to investigation by the plaintiff for alleged violations of the act. I do not construe the court’s opinion as saying more than this. Other problems are reserved for another day. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 , 788n, 95 S. Ct. 2004 , 44 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1975).