stating that elements of claim for promissory estoppel are (1) a promise, (2) that could be reasonably be expected to induce forbearance of a definite and substantial character, (3) which does induce such forbearance on the part of the promise, and (4) creates a circumstance where injustice may only be avoided by the enforcement of the promise
How later courts described this case
- stating that elements of claim for promissory estoppel are (1) a promise, (2) that could be reasonably be expected to induce forbearance of a definite and substantial character, (3) which does induce such forbearance on the part of the promise, and (4) creates a circumstance where injustice may only be avoided by the enforcement of the promise
- affirming trial court's finding that the writing was too indefinite to enforce on a conventional breach of contract theory, but reversing on the ground that the detrimental reliance occasioned by "an otherwise unenforceable promise" may present a substantial and compelling claim for relief based on promissory estoppel
- recognizing cause of action for promissory estoppel that permits recovery of damages for detrimental reliance on a promise in the absence of a binding contract
- recognizing promissory estop- pel theory may be invoked when promisee obtains promise from promisor that is less than a legally sufficient contract
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GREENHILL, Justice
(concurring).
The Court of Civil Appeals denied a recovery of damages here because the contract, it felt, was too indefinite in its provisions under Bryant v. Clark, 163 Tex. 596 , 358 S.W.2d 614 (1962). The holding in Bryant v. Clark was that the contract was not sufficiently definite to be specifically enforceable. The contract here in question, viewed in context, is different in some respects from that in the Bryant case; and I would not extend Bryant v. Clark. See the criticism of that case in 5A Corbin, Contracts 283 (1964).
*98 But assuming that the contract here, under Bryant v. Clark, is not definite enough to be specifically enforced, it is sufficiently definite to support an action for damages. Restatement, Contracts § 370, comment b.
There are Texas cases in which damages have been denied after a holding that the contract was not specifically enforceable. See, e. g., Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53 , 188 S.W.2d 150 (1945); Robertson v. Melton, 131 Tex. 325 , 115 S.W.2d 624 , 118 A.L.R. 1505 (1938); and Alworth v. Ellison, 27 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App.1930, writ refused). In each of these cases, however, the contracts were held to be within the Statute of Frauds and not enforceable for that reason in a suit for damages. 1 Willis-ton, Contracts § 16 (Rev.ed. 1936). The contract here in question is not within the Statute of Frauds and will support an action for damages.
While I agree with the judgment entered by the Court, it seems to me that the above is a sounder ground upon which to rest our decision.