holding mere arrest and subsequent questioning not sufficient formalization of proceedings to trigger requirement of counsel under the Sixth Amendment
How later courts described this case
- holding mere arrest and subsequent questioning not sufficient formalization of proceedings to trigger requirement of counsel under the Sixth Amendment
- "The mere arrest and subsequent questioning of a person do not constitute a sufficient formalization of proceedings to trigger the requirement of counsel under the Sixth Amendment."
- A[A]n accused=s right against self‑incrimination is personal, and cannot be invoked or waived by anyone other than the accused.@
- “[A]n accused’s right against self-incrimination is personal, and cannot be invoked or waived by anyone other than the accused.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled implicitly by Goodwin v. State, 799 S.W.2d 719 (1990)
[20] Roeder v. State, 768 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.App. 1st Dist.1988); Dunn v. State, 696 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Crim.App.1985), implicitly overruled by Goodwin v. State, 799 S.W.2d 719, 729 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 537 A.2d 446 (1988).
Overruled by Lucas v. State, 1989 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 55 (1989)
See Holloway v. Texas, 475 U.S. 1105, 106 S.Ct. 1508, 89 L.Ed.2d 908 (1986); Goodwin v. State, 799 S.W.2d 719, 729 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) ("the holding in Dunn has been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine.”). Moreover, Lucas was decided before the court of criminal appeals' opinion on remand in Holloway and has been implicitly overruled by that case.
Overruled by Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)
Dunn has been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986).
The opinion
MILLER, Judge,
concurring.
Addressing the concurring opinions of Judge Clinton and Judge Teague, I find the “Weber rule” unsatisfactory precisely be *575 cause it is rigorously structured. Predictability aside, I see no advantage to requiring a lawyer to be “actually present at a police station” in every instance. Given the unstructured balancing test of the majority opinion, a suspect’s right to remain silent and his right to counsel might compel the police to inform him that “his” attorney is trying to contact him from another state by telephone or is trying to contact him at a different police substation [applicable where the police move the suspect from place to place in order to thwart attempts by outsiders to locate him. See Foster v. State, 677 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) ], etc.
Rigid rules have the advantage of predictability but also carry the disadvantage of being subject to manipulation. I prefer a test broad enough to grant relief not only in the instant case, but in all other cases equally compelling, regardless of the physical circumstances. Thus, I join the opinion of the majority.