explaining that we assess whether “the income derived was in an amount substantially in excess of the County’s expenses for rent, operation and the like, so that the [activity] was a real moneymaking proposition”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that we assess whether “the income derived was in an amount substantially in excess of the County’s expenses for rent, operation and the like, so that the [activity] was a real moneymaking proposition”
- observing that the third-party plaintiffs had not alleged that any land of the original plaintiff had been invaded and that “[w]hat the third-party plaintiffs have attempted to do in their nuisance counts is simply to frame an action in negligence using somewhat different terms”
- discussing both public and private nuisance principles in connection with third- party claims for indemnification and damages against a county arising from an explosion caused by a landfill operation
- remarking that “distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is sometimes illusory in practice”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Flaherty v. Weinberg
300 Md. 539, 549-50, 479 A.2d 1321, 1326 (Md.1984), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 136, 492 A.2d 618, 628 (1985).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Town of Brunswick v. Hyatt, 91 Md. App. 555 (1992)
Noting that there was no evidence before the Court about the amount of expenses and revenue derived from the operation of the landfill, we distinguished the facts in Burns from Tadjer, observing that,
The opinion
ELDRIDGE, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the Court’s judgment insofar as it orders that there be a trial on the merits. Nevertheless, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in Judge Cole’s dissenting opinion in Austin v. City of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 78 , 405 A.2d 255, 269 (1979), and in my concurring and dissenting *555 opinion in the Austin case, 286 Md. at 67 , 405 A.2d at 263 , that the governmental-proprietary distinction is an irrational basis for determining whether local governments may be held liable in tort. The governmental-proprietary distinction, which has never been expressly sanctioned by the Maryland Legislature, was adopted by this Court relatively recently in history and with little reasoning. The distinction has proven to be unsound, and it should be abandoned.
COLE and DAVIDSON, JJ., authorize me to state that they concur with the views expressed herein.