the phrase “the character of the neighborhood” was “not so vague and indefinite that uniform application could not be assured.”
How later courts described this case
- the phrase “the character of the neighborhood” was “not so vague and indefinite that uniform application could not be assured.”
- same as to local ordinances
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Eagen :
It is my conclusion that, as written, the ordinance here involved is unconstitutional as applied to the ap *566 pellants’ land. The Act of March 11, 1959, P. L. 13, as amended, 53 P.S. §65758, permits Townships of the Second Class to regulate and license, inter alia, automobile junk or grave yards. However, the present ordinance, enacted thereunder, fails to provide definite standards which would uniformly govern the board of supervisors’ determinations of whether or not a permit should issue. Cf. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, 388 Pa. 444 , 130 A. 2d 686 (1957).
The standards governing the issuance of permits, as set forth in §6 of the ordinance, are too vague and indefinite. They provide that the permit shall issue only on consideration of the suitability of the property, the character of the neighborhood, and the economic and aesthetic effect of the use on the township. The court below, admitting the vague and indefinite character of the provisions of §6 at least by implication, looked to §10 for clarification and fortification of the necessary standards.
While it is true that the court is not bound by any one section to determine whether proper standards have been set forth, a reading of §10 clearly indicates that the provisions therein do not apply to the situation here presented, i.e., where the owner of a vacant lot seeks a permit to utilize it as a junk yard in the future. Section 10 provides standards for existing junk yards and is in no way applicable to vacant land proposed to be used as a junk yard. Unaided by §10 in the present instance, §6 provides inadequate standards for the issuance of a junk yard permit, and the ordinance as a whole is unconstitutional as applied to the land here involved. The ordinance being unconstitutional, no permit was necessary.
I dissent.
Mr. Justice Jones joins in this opinion.