discussing Tomah and stating that “we . . . decline[] to adopt fixed ‘Miranda-like warnings of the risks of self-representation and the benefits of counsel’ . . . .” (quoting Morrison, 567 A.2d at 1353 )
How later courts described this case
- discussing Tomah and stating that “we . . . decline[] to adopt fixed ‘Miranda-like warnings of the risks of self-representation and the benefits of counsel’ . . . .” (quoting Morrison, 567 A.2d at 1353 )
- discussing Tomah and stating that “we ... declineQ to adopt fixed ‘Miranda-like warnings of the risks of self-representation and the benefits of counsel’_” (quoting Morrison, 567 A.2d at 1353)
- while noting that North Dakota, Michigan, Iowa, and Colorado apply a de novo standard of review, the court concluded that Maine courts should apply a bifurcated standard of review for counsel waiver, reviewing any express or implicit factual findings for clear error, and the legal conclusions de novo
- “[T]he right to representation by counsel requires that every reasonable presumption must be indulged against waiver.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CALKINS, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
[¶ 45] I respectfully dissent from Part 11(C)(1) of the Court’s opinion affirming the judgment of conviction of Hank Watson. I concur in Part 11(B) of the Court’s opinion regarding the standard of review and in Part 11(C)(2) vacating the judgment of conviction of Jonathan Blumberg.
[¶ 46] Like Justice Silver, I dissent from Part 11(C)(1) because the record does not demonstrate that Watson knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. I write separately, however, because unlike Justice Silver, I do not conclude that the trial court’s failure to warn Watson about the pitfalls of self-represen *719 tation requires us to conclude that there was not a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. I agree that ordinarily a trial court should warn the pro se defendant with language similar to that suggested in Justice Silver’s dissent. However, I do not go so far as to say that warnings are required in every case. I believe that there are cases in which a trial court’s express finding of waiver of the right to counsel could be affirmed, even in the absence of warnings. For example, when the trial court articulates the facts that form the basis for its finding of a voluntary and intelligent waiver, and such facts are supported by the record, an appellate court should affirm the waiver finding. Even an implicit finding of waiver could be affirmed in the absence of warnings when the record is replete with facts showing a voluntary and intelligent waiver sufficient to overcome the strong presumption against waiver. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).
[¶47] In this case, the court neither warned Watson of the pitfalls of self-representation nor expressly stated the facts that led it to find that Watson had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The record may be sufficient to support an implicit finding that Watson knew he had a right to counsel and understood the substance of the charge against him, but it is devoid of evidence that he understood that there would be technical and procedural rules that he would be expected to follow, that he would be at a disadvantage, and that he would be held to the same standards as an attorney. Given the strong presumption against waiver of the right to counsel, the absence of warnings of the pitfalls of self-representation, and of any findings by the court regarding the knowledge of Watson and the voluntariness of his waiver, the record is insufficient to support a finding that Watson “fully apprehend[ed] ... the perils of self-representation, and the requirements that will be placed upon him,” United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir.2002). For this reason, I would vacate Watson’s conviction.