refusing to interpret a statute in a manner inconsistent with its plain and ordinary meaning, particularly when it is clear from the statutory scheme as a whole that the Legislature did not intend a contrary result
How later courts described this case
- refusing to interpret a statute in a manner inconsistent with its plain and ordinary meaning, particularly when it is clear from the statutory scheme as a whole that the Legislature did not intend a contrary result
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WATHEN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. It is evident that the Legislature did not contemplate the equipment rental business when it enacted 36 M.R.S.A. § 655(1)(B) in 1973. The exemption applies to stock in trade and specifically includes inventory held for resale. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “stock in trade” as “[t]he inventory carried by a retail business for sale in the ordinary course of business. Also, the tools and equipment owned and used by a tradesman.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1271 (5th ed. 1979). Although the equipment in question could be considered as inventory held for resale and thus exempt from taxation, it is principally inventory that is held for lease and, as such, is subject to taxation. The statute makes no provision for allocating between a taxable and an exempt use of the same inventory. Because we are required to strictly construe exemptions from taxation, see Advanced Med. Research Found. v. Cushing, 555 A.2d 1040, 1041 (Me.1989). I would affirm the decision of the Board of Assessment Review.