holding that a science teacher did not violate a ministerial duty to a student who received an eye injury during a science experiment when the teacher failed to provide eye protection to the student prior to the experiment because the policy at issue required “the instructor to engage in a discretionary act, i.e., to exercise personal deliberation and judgment by examining the facts and reach a reasoned conclusion with regard to the applicability of the dictates of the written policy”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a science teacher did not violate a ministerial duty to a student who received an eye injury during a science experiment when the teacher failed to provide eye protection to the student prior to the experiment because the policy at issue required “the instructor to engage in a discretionary act, i.e., to exercise personal deliberation and judgment by examining the facts and reach a reasoned conclusion with regard to the applicability of the dictates of the written policy”
- stating that official is entitled to immunity unless plaintiff can show that officer acted with actual malice or an intent to injure in undertaking his discretionary acts of hiring and retaining em- ployees
- affording official immunity to teacher because a school policy requiring the use of protective eyewear during activities involving “explosive materials” did not define the term “explosive materials” and thus “the policy required the instructor to engage in a discretionary act, i.e., to exercise personal deliberation and judgment by examining the facts and reach a reasoned conclusion with regard to the applicability of the dictates of the written policy”
- holding teacher shielded by official immunity because school policy did not define key term, therefore requiring teacher to exercise discretion in implementation of the policy
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority holds that because the term “explosive materials” is not defined in the written eye-protection policy, Grammens was required to use discretion in deciding whether the policy applied to the “bottle rocket” experiment and was thus entitled to official immunity from personal liability for the injury at issue. Because I disagree with the foundation for this analysis, i.e., the determination that the term “explosive materials” is somehow ambiguous, I must respectfully dissent.
As noted by the Court of Appeals, the instructions for the experiment warned of “the possibility of the bottle exploding.” Dollar v. Grammens, 294 Ga. App. 888, 892 ( 670 SE2d 555 ) (2008). Although Grammens presented the affidavit of a mechanical engineer concluding that the experiment “did not involve explosive materials or an explosion but rather was a controlled venting of pressure,” id., the eye-protection policy is not a technical document drafted for use by members of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Its terms should be evaluated in accordance with the manner in which they would be reviewed by Forsyth County school teachers, and the common understanding of terms such as “explosive,” “exploding” and “explosion” encompasses the launching of a projectile using air pressure. See Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1973), p. 404 (defining “explode” as, inter alia, “to burst forth with sudden violence or noise”). Because application of the eye-protection policy in this situation required no discretion on the part of Grammens, she is not entitled to official immunity, and I would affirm the Court of Appeals’s reversal of the trial court’s grant of *622 summary judgment to her.
Decided July 5, 2010
Reconsideration denied July 26, 2010.
Gray, Rust, St. Amand, Moffett & Brieske, Matthew G. Moffett, Wayne S. Melnick, Harben & Hartley, Phillip L. Hartley, Martha M. Pearson, for appellant.
Holland, Schaefer, Roddenbery & Blitch, James D. Blitch TV, for appellees.
Womack, Gottlieb & Rodham, Ronald R. Womack, Steven M. Rodham, amici curiae.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Carley and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.