in which the history of the rule is discussed
How later courts described this case
- in which the history of the rule is discussed
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Melvin Mayfield, Chief Judge, concurring. The appellants concede that there is substantial evidence which would support a decision either granting or denying ap-pellee’s claim. But that is not the appellants’ point. Their contention is that the Commission’s decision was not made by finding that the claimant met his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, but by resolving all the inferences in the claimant’s favor. That the Commission used that standard is plainly established by the record in this case.
After the Commission had agreed with the administrative law judge and had adopted his decision, the appellants filed a motion for clarification asking that the Commission state whether it determined “the preponderance of the evidence by drawing inferences favorable to the claimant upon evidence which, absent such inferences, would not preponderate in favor of claimant” and the Commission issued another opinion and said “the answer to this question is in the affirmative.”
In explaining its answer, the Commission started with the case of Boyd Excelsior Fuel Company v. McKown, 226 Ark. 174 , 288 S.W.2d 614 (1956), and pointed out that the majority opinion stated “doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of the claimant.’’ The next case cited was Holland v. Malvern Sand & Gravel Co., 237 Ark. 635 , 374 S.W.2d 822 (1964), and the Commission quoted from the majority opinion which stated “where one inference would support an award and another would defeat it, the inference supporting the award must be adopted.” The Commission then noted other cases, from the Supreme Court and from the Court of Appeals, for example, O.K. Processing, Inc. v. Servold, 265 Ark. 352 , 578 S.W.2d 224 (1979), and Bunny Bread v. Shipman, 267 Ark. 926 , 591 S.W.2d 692 (Ark. App. 1979), and concluded that a rule of “liberal construction” was “obligatory” upon the Commission.
I agree that the Commission’s conclusion is compelled by the decisions of our appellate courts. Although the standard used by the Commission may not completely “shift the burden of proof from the claimant” as claimed by appellants, or may not completely “rob the Commission of its fact-finding function” which was a concern of the court in Johnson v. Valmac Industries, 269 Ark. 626 , 599 S.W.2d 440 (Ark. App. 1980), we should in candor admit that our decisions do not leave the Commission completely free to decide the issues upon a preponderance of the evidence; and if the Commission is not using the proper standard, it needs to be clearly told what standard it should use.
Cracraft, J., joins in this concurrence.