holding that cause in fact means that “an act or omission was a substantial factor in bring about the injury and without which no harm would have occurred” and that causation may be supported by circumstantial evidence and inferences therefrom
How later courts described this case
- holding that cause in fact means that “an act or omission was a substantial factor in bring about the injury and without which no harm would have occurred” and that causation may be supported by circumstantial evidence and inferences therefrom
- concluding that although the precise circumstances of the murder would never be known, plaintiffs had introduced enough evidence for the jury to conclude that the store's inadequate security system was a cause of the victim's death
- holding any alteration to court of appeals’ opinion or judgment entitles party to file further motion for rehearing; construing Tex.R.App. P. 100(d), 49 Tex. B.J. 584 (Tex.1986), amended by Tex. R.App. P. 100(d), 53 Tex. B.J. 612 (Tex.1990) (amended 1997, now Tex.R.App. P. 49.5)
- defining cause in fact “as an act or omission that was a substantial factor in bringing about an injury and without which no harm would have occurred,” and holding that investigating officers may qualify to testify as experts concerning causation based on their knowledge of underlying facts and their expertise
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PHILLIPS, Justice,
concurring.
Although I share to some extent the concerns expressed by the dissent regarding the excessive use of marginal “experts” in modern trial practice, I believe that the testimony of the fact witnesses, taken together, constitutes more than a scintilla of evidence to support the verdict in this case for the Havners. Accordingly, I join in the court’s judgment.
The factual evidence in the record is detailed in the court’s opinion. Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, it provides some evidence that Havner was taken suddenly and against her will by her assailant from inside the store, that E-Z Mart chose not to equip the store with various available safety devices, that one or more of those devices could have been successfully activated by Havner, and that the local police could have arrived on the scene within one minute after receiving the alarm. Finally, the failure of the police investigation, focusing on Havner’s past friends and acquaintances, is some evidence that the crime was perpetrated by a stranger.
Whether some, most, or even all of the expert testimony proffered in this case was conjecture or surmise is thus an interesting, but at this juncture irrelevant, inquiry. I agree that this cause should be remanded to the court of appeals to review the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding as to causation.
COOK, J., joins in this concurring opinion.