finding adoption decree void and plaintiff [former same-sex partner of defendant] not legally recognizable as the minor child's parent where "[p]laintiff was not seeking an adoption available under Chapter 48. In her petition for adoption, plaintiff explained to the adoption court that she sought an adoption decree that would establish the legal relationship of parent and child with the minor child, but not sever that same relationship between defendant and the minor child. As we have established, such relief does not exist under Chapter 48." (Citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- finding adoption decree void and plaintiff [former same-sex partner of defendant] not legally recognizable as the minor child's parent where "[p]laintiff was not seeking an adoption available under Chapter 48. In her petition for adoption, plaintiff explained to the adoption court that she sought an adoption decree that would establish the legal relationship of parent and child with the minor child, but not sever that same relationship between defendant and the minor child. As we have established, such relief does not exist under Chapter 48." (Citations omitted)
- holding that trial court erred in entering order in case where its subject matter jurisdiction had not been invoked and that order was therefore void ab initio
- affirming that non-biological parent could be granted custody rights “because [biological mother] acted inconsistently with her 29 paramount parental status”
- affirming that non-biologieal parent could be granted custody rights “because [biological mother] acted inconsistently with her paramount parental status”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON
dissenting.
[A]fter the final order of adoption is entered, no party to an adoption proceeding nor anyone claiming under such a party may question the validity of the adoption because of any defect or irregularity, jurisdictional or otherwise, in the proceeding, but shall be fully bound by the order.
N.C.G.S. § 48-2-607(a) (2009) (emphasis added).
Because Melissa Ann Jarrell is statutorily barred from challenging the adoption decree, I dissent.
The legislature identified two narrow situations when challenges are allowed, and neither permits Jarrell’s challenge. Id. First, Jarrell did not appeal within thirty days of the final adoption decree. Id. § 48-2-607(b) (2009). Second, she failed to move to set aside the decree within six months of a discovery that her consent to the adoption was obtained by fraud or duress. Id. § 48-2-607(c) (2009). Instead, Jarrell challenged the adoption nearly two years after entry of the final adoption decree. This she cannot do. The plain language of N.C.G.S. § 48-2-607(a) bars her claim.
This Court must respect the statutory limitations imposed by the legislature and should not reach substantive issues not before it. The *554 legislature determined it to be'in the best interest of minors that adoptions be final, see id. §§ 48-l-100(b)(l) (2009), 48-2-607(a), and allowed challenges in narrow circumstances, none of which are satisfied in this case. The wisdom of these restrictions to adoption challenges is an issue for the legislature to decide, not this Court. And if the members of our General Assembly wish to modify these restrictions, it is their prerogative and role to do so.